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 WATER SCARCITY AS A WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY 
FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST 
 
 
 
RAYAN AMINE HAMMOUD 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
Water shortage and the deterioration of water quality in the Middle Eastern region are 
alarming. The question of water shortage is becoming a salient issue and a prominent 
potential source of conflict. This thesis examines the various researches from various 
fields of study that have simulated forthcoming Middle Eastern water war, amid dramatic 
increase in water demands beyond national capacities.  It examines the existing state of 
war between Lebanon and Israel and illustrates that unless a water cooperation 
arrangement is soon reached alternatives may yield grave consequences. This necessitates 
technical as well as ideological reorientations in national ideological discourses that shift 
attitudes and policies from a national to a regional development-based paradigm. The 
thesis demonstrates various models and possibilities for cooperation over water 
managements between Israel and Lebanon that can divert possible conflict and renewed 
war. An action plan with a water management road map is proposed to be implemented 
as to place the use of water resources efficiently and productively.  The model can serve 
for multilateral cooperation to resolve the problem of water shortage in the Middle East.   
 
 
Keywords: Water scarcity /Peaceful settlement in the Middle East /Water management /Water 
models/ Virtual water / Zionist ideology/ Water realities/ Water in the Lebanese ideology.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 VII
 TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
I ‐ WATER CHALLENGES IN THE MIDDLE EAST ...................................................................... 1‐18 
 
1.1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 1 
1.2. A Question of Perspective .................................................................................................... 2 
1.3. Research Question & Objectives .......................................................................................... 6 
1.4. Principles of Resolving Water Disputes ............................................................................... 8 
1.5. Perspectives on Conflict Resolution ................................................................................... 10 
1.5.1. Arguments against War ................................................................................................ 10 
1.5.2. Arguments against Non-Cooperation ........................................................................... 11 
1.6. Scenario of Settlement and its complexities ....................................................................... 13 
1.7. Conclusion .......................................................................................................................... 15 
1.8. Proposed Possible Resolution Model .................................................................................. 16 
1.9. Structure of the Study ......................................................................................................... 16 
 
II‐ NATIONAL IDEOLOGIES IN ISRAEL & LEBANON &   THE CENTRALITY OF WATER ............ 18‐36 
 
2.1. Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 18 
2.2. Water and the Zionist Ideology ........................................................................................... 18 
2.3. Water in the Lebanese Ideology.......................................................................................... 23 
2.4. National Ideologies versus Water Realities ........................................................................ 32 
 
III ‐ POTENTIAL WATER MODELS TO PROMOTE COOPERATION BETWEEN LEBANON & ISRAEL
 ......................................................................................................................................... 36‐50 
 
3.1. Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 36 
3.2. Current Challenges .............................................................................................................. 37 
3.2.1. Water Realities ............................................................................................................. 37 
3.2.2. Limitations on Available Options ................................................................................ 38 
3.3. Potential Water Models ....................................................................................................... 40 
3.3.1. Unilateral Models ......................................................................................................... 40 
 VIII
3.3.2. Multilateral/Cooperative Models ................................................................................. 41 
3.4. The Concept of Virtual Water ............................................................................................. 45 
3.5. Virtual Water & Cooperative Frameworks ......................................................................... 48 
3.6. Conclusion .......................................................................................................................... 49 
 
IV‐ RECONCILING NATIONAL IDEOLOGIES & REGIONAL COOPERATION ............................. 50‐63 
4.1. Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 50 
4.2. Ideological Discourses in Lebanon & Israel ....................................................................... 51 
4.3. Ideology & the Water Issue Perspective ............................................................................. 55 
4.3.1. The Israeli Perspective ................................................................................................. 56 
4.3.2. The Lebanese Perspective ............................................................................................ 58 
4.4. Obstacles & Opportunities .................................................................................................. 59 
4.5. Conclusion .......................................................................................................................... 61 
 
V‐ CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDED ACTION PLAN ............................................................ 63‐72 
5.1. Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 63 
5.2. Summary & Conclusions .................................................................................................... 63 
5.3. Recommended Action Plan ................................................................................................. 67 
5.3.1. Assumptions ................................................................................................................. 67 
5.3.2. Objectives of the Action Plan ...................................................................................... 68 
5.3.3. The Action Plan ........................................................................................................... 69 
 
VI‐ BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................ 72‐76 
 
 
 
 
 IX
 X
 CHAPTER ONE 
I ­ WATER CHALLENGES IN THE MIDDLE EAST 
1.1. Introduction 
 
For much of the last century, the Middle East has been the hotbed of an ongoing 
conflict between the Arab states and Israel. The historical, ideological and geopolitical 
causes and characteristics of this conflict have long been discussed, analyzed and 
contemplated by numerous researchers and scholars from different areas of political 
science, history, international relations, diplomacy and conflict resolution. One of the 
many issues involved in and related to this chronic conflict has been the question of water 
resources, particularly as the Middle East is depicted among the most water-impoverished 
regions of the world. The question of water as a salient issue and a prominent potential 
source of conflict in the Middle East, however, has often taken a backseat when 
compared to other issues such as resolving issues of territorial borders, displaced people 
and other anodyne negotiations. While the question of water in these conflicts is not 
always addressed directly, it seems to resurface in any round of negotiations between the 
conflicting parties. In recent years, moreover, politicians on different sides in the Middle 
East have been referring to water as the most likely cause of the next outbreak of violence 
in the region. For example, Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah, the Secretary General of the 
Lebanese militant group Hezbollah, continues to refer to Israel’s interest in Lebanese 
waters and warns that water resources will eventually be one of the major causes of 
violent conflict with Israel.  
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Similarly, Israeli leaders and officials have repeatedly announced the fact that 
water resources constitute an integral element of Israel’s national security. This has also 
been seen in the actions and positions of the Israeli government over the years. For 
example, one major obstacle in the negotiations over land with Syria lies in the fact that 
Israel is vehemently opposed to allowing Syrians any access to Like Tiberius, which 
constitutes Israel’s largest reservoir of fresh water. During the Six Day War, the Israeli 
military strategy focused on occupying the Golan Heights from Syria and the West Bank, 
thus consolidating its control over the major sources of the waters of the River Jordan 
Basin in the former and over the main sources of fresh water aquifers in the latter 
(Shapland, 1997). Moreover, in the 1970s and 1980s, further military actions up north in 
Lebanon resulted in Israeli control of several Lebanese rivers until 2000, when Israeli 
troops finally withdrew from South Lebanon.  
Ultimately, the wars fought in the region in 1948, 1956, 1967, 1973, 1978, 1982 
and 2006 were not driven and motivated by water needs alone, but it is evident from the 
ensuing diplomatic tracks, negotiation positions and statements of politicians on both 
sides that water has been a salient factor in the ongoing conflict between Israel and its 
neighbors. Additionally, with the growing populations and inherent water needs in the 
Middle East, and with the intensifying scarcity of the quantity of water and the 
continuous deterioration of the quality of water sources in the region, questions related to 
water as a primary issue of strategic importance will continue to plague the region.  
1.2. A Question of Perspective 
 
Irrespective of the field of research or the area of interest from which experts on 
water resources in the Middle East come from, the main discourse on this issue seems to 
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assume a common position, namely that water was, is, and will be a major source of 
conflict in the region, particularly between Israel and its neighbors, especially Lebanon, 
Syria, and the Palestinians Territories (Al-Kattan, 1998). In fact, researchers, observers 
and practitioners from different fields often predict that the Middle East will sooner or 
later be on the brink of war over water sources, especially as the demand for water 
continues to increase dramatically at a time when supply is dangerously approaching its 
limit (Isaac, 2000; Tomanbay, 2000). Such predictions are not without merit. For 
example, Naff and Matson (1984) warned in the early 1980s that Israel’s available water 
resources may be reaching their limit by the mid-1990s, possibly paving the road for a 
new war. Similarly, The Israeli Water Commission (2000) warned that Israel’s projected 
water shortages will reach 445 million cubic meters in 2020. Zaslavsky (2001) also 
estimated that Israel’s total water shortages will exceed 2,000 million cubic meters by 
2020.  
Figures on the estimated shortages of neighboring countries that share water 
pathways and sources with Israel, especially Lebanon and Syria, are scarce; but given the 
fact that 80% of the region’s waters are inefficiently used for the continuously growing 
needs of agriculture and irrigation, as well as the fact that all Middle Eastern countries 
(with the exception of Lebanon) are classified as water-stressed or water-impoverished 
nations, it is not difficult to depict support for the pessimistic assumptions and predictions 
of future wars and violent conflict scenarios over water in the region (Bahloul, 2000; 
Baker, 2000). Additionally, Shapland (1997) points out that the political mindset in the 
region is still oriented towards war, especially over the question of water. For example, 
aside from the repeated threats that are frequently issued by Hezbollah officials in 
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Lebanon, Israeli officials have also repeatedly made it clear that they see water as an 
issue of national security. Furthermore, in 1995, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin 
mentioned that the greatest danger facing Israel during the ongoing cooperation 
negotiations at the time was the potential loss of control over the water resources of the 
Golan, especially Banias. Similarly, the Israeli Foreign Minister at the time, Ehud Barak, 
was adamant over Israel’s position in refusing to allow the Syrians to return to the shores 
of Lake Tiberius for strategic water concerns when he said, “We don’t want to see Syrian 
feet in the Kinneret” (Shapland, 1997, p.39).  
While water war scenarios in the Middle East are by all means viable and 
legitimate, not only based on past experiences but also on the basis of the current 
hardliner positions of the different parties, other perspectives may also be possible. 
Despite the history of violence in the region over the past century, it is evident that these 
manifestations have not brought us any closer to resolving the water dispute, and it is 
unlikely that future wars will carry any of the conflicting parties to a final and permanent 
cooperation. Additionally, unlike other elements of conflict, water emerges as the only 
major factor that accords no respect or consideration to the political, strategic, military or 
geographic characteristics or interests of the involved parties. Not only does the issue of 
water impose its presence and realities on the political and strategic agendas of the 
nations in the region, but it is also, more often than not the only issue with which political 
leaders cannot practice the game of patience or the adopt a of “wait-and-see”. Syria, for 
example, has adopted a posture of patience for over three decades in its negotiations with 
Israel, and Israel maintained a similar position during its occupation of South Lebanon 
for over two decades; but while questions pertaining to territory and borders can wait for 
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as long as politicians find an interest in playing the waiting game, water imposes its own 
rules.  
Severe water shortages cannot and do not wait, especially in times of severe 
droughts that may last for years. Additionally, the deterioration of water quality, a 
problem facing all nations in the region, is also another serious issue that can only be 
resolved through measures taken in coordination by the different conflicting players that 
share water sources and pathways (Khalifa, 2001; Priscoli & Wolf, 2009). Political 
players in the region may be convinced for ideological or other reasons that they may be 
able to win water conflicts in the long term, but severe water issues often have their own 
schedule and are unlikely to offer hawkish political leaders and war-oriented ideologists 
the leeway they hope to have to resolve the conflict by violent means. Ultimately, 
peaceful alternatives must be considered.  
It is out of these considerations that the perspective and rationale of this 
dissertation evolved. While the conflict in the Middle East may be among the most 
complicated on the international level, Aytemiz (2001) points out that 40% of the world 
population share international rivers and basins and that on various occasions, enemies 
have had to pursue alternative peaceful solutions as the only viable means possible to 
deal with their water needs and pressures. This has even been the case among some 
nations that have fought multiple wars over historic, religious and ideological causes as is 
the case in the Middle East and other parts of the world, such as Pakistan, Bangladesh 
and India.  
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1.3. Research Question & Objectives 
 
The main aim of this paper is not to explore the potential solutions for water crisis 
solutions in the Middle East. Rather, the main objective is to explore the possibility of 
utilizing the problems and issues associated with water resources, as a potential window 
of opportunity to bring the conflicting parties in the Middle East together toward a 
peaceful resolution. This approach differs from previous approaches to the Middle East 
conflict in at least two ways.  
First of all, it does not assume that the question of water is a residual issue that 
will be resolved along with the bigger cooperation package over land and borders. 
Rather, it holds that the conflict over water and the nature of the water crisis can be used 
as a means to set the conflicting players in a mode of cooperation and coordination that 
will help them address their shared water needs peacefully and that may set the 
groundwork for a wider peaceful resolution in the long term.  
Secondly, this approach assumes that the water crisis in the Middle East 
represents a window of opportunity because of the very nature of water itself. To 
elaborate, the issues of a water crisis are pressuring, overwhelming and immediate by 
their nature. In other words, this is an issue that offers ideologists and politicians very 
little freedom to exercise political patience and procrastination, especially when 
considering the magnitude and extent of the effects of water shortages and of the 
deterioration of water quality on the economic and social interests of their constituencies.  
Hence, the research question of this study is based on the recognition of 
transforming an existing source of conflict into a window of opportunity for peaceful 
cooperation as a first step toward additional cooperation-based initiatives in the future. 
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More precisely, the research question of this study is: To what extent can water issues be 
transformed into grounds of mutual cooperation and coordination between parties at 
conflict in the Middle East with special emphasis on Lebanon and Israel? 
The study is limited to Lebanon and Israel for a number of reasons. First of all, 
addressing all water-related conflicts involving Israel and its neighbors would be a very 
extensive undertaking that cannot be possibly contained within a study of this size and 
nature, especially when considering the complicated questions involving different water 
resources (e.g. rivers, lakes, aquifers) with Syria, Lebanon, the Palestinian Territories and 
Jordan. Secondly, several of the rivers and other water sources are stretched 
geographically, making the inclusion of other nations even far more complicated. 
Thirdly, unlike other bilateral relations in the region, Israel and Lebanon do not have any 
major or significant territorial border disputes since the borders between the two 
countries are already demarcated and internationally recognized. This allows for a less 
complicated case setting by excluding other potential issues that may interfere with 
negotiations or agreements over mutual cooperation as the case would be with Syria or 
the Palestinian Territories, for example. Fourthly, the case of Lebanon and Israel offers 
an opportunity to explore the opportunities for peaceful cooperation over water from a 
number of angles because of the nature of shared and unshared water resources in these 
two countries since both countries share mutual water resources. At the same time, 
Lebanon possesses a number of water resources in areas that enjoy water abundance and 
which are located close to Israeli areas that suffer water shortages, thus presenting 
opportunities for water exchange and sharing schemes through peaceful means (Naff & 
Matson, 1984).  
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 Needless to mention, while the starting point of the research question and of the 
research rationale of this dissertation may be perceived as utopian or unrealistic for a 
region that has become too accustomed to war, a number of factors make the 
consideration of such a perspective compelling. First of all, regardless of the intentions of 
any of the players in the region for war or cooperation, the fact that war has become a 
prohibitively costly option is becoming an increasingly recognized reality, especially in 
the light of the most recent outbreak of violence between Lebanon and Israel in 2006.  
Secondly, even if the nations in the region still believed, for one reason or 
another, that violent conflict is a more viable option to resolve their water disputes, the 
fact remains that many of the problems pertaining to water quantity and quality needs 
cannot and will not be resolved without the cooperation of different players, and 
irrespective of whether or not they find this notion ideologically or politically acceptable. 
Water, after all, remains the only factor in this conflict impervious to the ideological or 
political considerations and interests of the parties involved in the conflict.  
1.4. Principles of Resolving Water Disputes 
 
The objective of this section serves to address the various principles and 
frameworks available with a view towards resolving water conflicts before relating it to 
the case study of Lebanon and Israel.  
Although water issues and conflicts have been very common in the past, 
developments in international law to address such conflicts and concerns have been very 
modest, often requiring nations to resolve such matters on their own. As Kliot (1994) 
points out, the main obstacle to the development of international laws on water issues has 
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been the question of national sovereignty. In this context, several principles can be 
depicted.  
Perhaps the oldest principle pertaining to water conflicts is the Harmon Doctrine, 
also known as the theory of absolute territorial sovereignty (Kliot, 1994). This concept is 
self-exploratory as it holds that nations enjoy absolute freedom to exercise their will with 
whatever resources lie on their territories regardless of what the needs or concerns of 
others may be. This doctrine, however, has proven to be highly unpractical and enjoys 
very little credibility today since it completely ignores the rights of other riparian nations 
that share these water sources.  
Secondly, the absolute territorial integrity theory holds that the sovereignty of 
nations extends along with water paths. More specifically, this theory holds that       
lower-riparian states exercise sovereignty over the right to enjoy unaltered flows of water 
into their territories from upper-riparian states. Other theories, also suffering limited 
credibility or recognition, include the theory of prior appropriation doctrine, the doctrine 
of riparian rights, the theory of limited territorial sovereignty and the theory of equitable 
apportionment (Kliot, 1994).  
On the other hand, the theory of equitable utilization seems to have gained 
significant traction and credibility internationally, primarily recognizing the rights of 
nations to use water resources to the extent that they do not harm the rights and interests 
of other riparian states. This principle gained support internationally during the UN 
Water Conference at Mar del Plata, Argentina in 1997 which stipulated, “In relation to 
the use, management and development of shared (international) water resources, national 
policies should take into consideration the right of each state sharing the resources to 
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equitably utilize such resources as the means to promote bonds of solidarity and 
cooperation” (Kliot, 1994, p.54).  
In effect, however, the resolution of conflicts over water resources remains 
severely undeveloped in international law, often leaving nations to their own devices to 
seek solutions through negotiations, bargaining and cooperation. Ultimately, war and 
violence have also been among the options available to nations to resolve such issues.  
1.5. Perspectives on Conflict Resolution 
 
Interestingly, the literature on water conflicts seems to imply that water may be 
the likely cause of violence and war in the future on the one hand. On the other hand, 
however, it strongly suggests that water conflicts are often difficult or impossible to 
resolve through the use of violence or war.  
1.5.1. Arguments against War 
 
Priscoli and Wolf (2009) developed an extensive framework to support the claim 
that, in principle, the argument for water war (or the use of violence to resolve water 
conflicts and disputes) is not viable. To start with, the economic argument under this 
perspective holds that the economic costs of waging war over water is tremendously and 
prohibitively expensive to the point that it would discourage players from going to war to 
resolve their water conflicts. This may be particularly relevant in the Middle East. It is 
true that Israel succeeded in acquiring water-rich territories in the past, but this has not 
resolved its water shortage problems. In addition to this, the most recent war in 2006 was 
not only extremely costly both for Lebanon and Israel, but it also ended with the status 
quo maintained and without any territorial or real political gains for either side. 
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Additionally, even if a particular state were to annex a water-rich territory, making a 
permanent claim over such territorial gains is next to impossible. This is not to mention 
that the construction of any structures to improve the utilization of acquired water 
resources, such as dams, would be difficult because such facilities and plants would be 
easily subject to sabotage and destruction by the opponent.  
Secondly, the strategic argument holds that even if nations used war to pursue a 
resolution for water disputes, they would still be unable to achieve their strategic 
objectives (Priscoli & Wolf, 2009). In the case of Israel and Lebanon, for example, it 
would be extremely difficult and costly for either side to achieve any strategic goals by 
going to war over water resources because of the demographic and geopolitical 
considerations (among others) of the terrain that make it impossible for any side to lay 
claims to land and water pathways and to impose a new strategic reality on the ground. 
Even at present, the state of tension prevailing in South Lebanon means that the Lebanese 
side is unable to make any real use of several of its water resources such as the Hasbani 
and Wazzani rivers. At the same time, Israel is unable to benefit from these rivers despite 
their close proximity to its borders. Going to war is unlikely to transform this situation, as 
the past three decades have shown that maintaining full and absolute control over the 
ground by either side is extremely difficult.  
1.5.2. Arguments against Non-Cooperation 
 
Even if nations chose not to go to war and held on to their grounds by maintaining 
the status quo, as is the case now in much of the Middle East, this does not constitute a 
solution to water issues and needs. To the contrary, the opposite may be true as water 
realities start to impose themselves. Priscoli and Wolf (2009) refer to this as the cost of 
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non-cooperation which they argue results in a number of serious losses for disputing and 
non-cooperating sides. First of all, even if nations chose to stall the conflict and maintain 
the status quo over water issues, the laws of water demand and supply do not recognize 
the status quo. Droughts, rapid population growth and economic development sooner or 
later impose their weight and water demands begin to press decision-makers to change 
their positions, especially when there is little or no room to expand the supply of water.  
Secondly, problems related to water quality are also likely to emerge, overriding 
the fact that politicians prefer the status quo and imposing new realities on both sides 
(Priscoli & Wolf, 2009). When disputing parties do not cooperate, the use of water 
supplies in one or both nations will result in the deterioration of water quality to the 
detriment of one or both sides, especially in the long term. This may even occur in the 
absence of conflict. For example, in the case of the Orontes River, no conflict exists 
between Lebanon and Syria over the use of the waters of this river which springs from 
Lebanon and flows into Syria. Additionally, the Lebanese side has little need for the 
waters of this river whereas it constitutes an extremely important source of water for 
Syria. Nevertheless, the quality of the waters of this river has suffered over the past 
decades as a result of pollution on Lebanese territories, forcing the Syrian side to pressure 
the Lebanese government to maintaining the quality of the river waters (Naff & Matson, 
1984). In the case of conflicting nations, the refusal to cooperate can even become more 
costly for both sides and may constitute a cause for continuously rising tensions that 
undermine economic and social development for both in the long term. In fact, the need 
for cooperation, regardless of whether riparian nations are at cooperation or war, is 
impossible to deny because it is not simply limited to issues of demand and supply; it also 
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includes other questions such as the need to protect water from diseases and pollution, 
and the extreme difficulty of implementing multi-use projects without the cooperation of 
other riparian nations.  
Recent literature has also emerged on conflict resolution over issues pertaining to 
water and other resources, highlighting the need for cooperation among conflicting 
nations to reduce costs, maximize benefits and to generate benefits that cannot be 
otherwise attainable by either side alone. Among such models that will be integrated into 
the framework of this paper are those developed by Waterbury (1982), and Fisher and 
Ury (1981), in addition to the alternative dispute resolution techniques of conflict 
transformation suggested by Priscoli and Wolf (2009).  
1.6. Scenario of Settlement and its complexities 
 
Having elaborated on the potential water wars that could explode in the region and 
having introduced some possible resolution models that would be elaborated in later 
chapters, it is important to note that a scenario of settlement between Lebanon & Israel 
should be set forward to accompany any cooperation between the two parties. The 
conflict between Israel and Middle Eastern countries has been ongoing for many years 
and it is often assumed that an individual Israeli-Lebanese bilateral peace deal is not a 
realistic option. It is important to set it as part of a broader regional agreement. In 
addition to that, there are currently no ongoing negotiations between Israel and Lebanon 
in the larger frame of a passive regional peace effort of the involved parties. Given these 
facts, it should also be highlighted that the current US administration has articulated its 
concern to pursue a comprehensive peace on its agenda but this has been proven 
ineffective. Consequently, this lack of progress with respect to negotiations has 
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historically resulted in sporadic violence between Lebanon & Israel.                                                          
On one hand, Lebanese officials have been reluctant to engage in any negotiations with 
Israel because most undermine the Lebanese sovereignty. Additionally, the divisions and 
the complications of the Lebanese domestic politics have hindered or prevented the 
progress of this settlement between the two parties. On the other hand, the Zionist 
ideology refrains from accepting any negotiation since most of them involve withdrawing 
from currently occupied territories.  Subsequently, a common effort should be made 
between the various divisions of the Lebanese domestic politics to agree on a common 
goal, by shaping expectations and explaining to the population that such settlement could 
be beneficial from a political, economic and social point of view.  And Israeli officials 
should recognize that some compromise should be done to create this two-state 
settlement and that the intangibility of their Zionist ideology should be reconsidered for 
the sake of future generations.  A concerted effort must be made to shape expectations of 
both parties taking into consideration the complexities that are currently preventing it 
from being realized. A successful implementation with Lebanon and Israel could 
eventually incite other neighboring Arab countries to put it back on their agendas which 
would prove to be a blessing for the blossoming of the region.  To be effective, this 
settlement process between Lebanon and Israel would require a mutually trusted arbiter 
that would considerably facilitate the process and the two-state settlement should be 
approached as an incremental exchange of concessions between the two parties. 
Ultimately, the objective of this thesis is to show that the potential water conflict may be 
seen as a starting point for this settlement between the conflicting parties by transforming 
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a conflict into a mean to create opportunities for promoting peace between the two 
countries and eventually setting an example to the region.  
1.7. Conclusion 
 
The conflict in the Middle East has been ongoing for many years now. The two 
sides to this conflict, the Arabs and Israel, may or may not reach a peaceful resolution 
over occupied territories, religious symbols and displaced populations any time soon. It 
may even be argued that neither side feels pressured to reach a permanent solution any 
time soon. While land and people may wait and politicians may easily play the patience 
and waiting cards for years, water issues follow their own agenda and may set a potential 
flashpoint for regional strife. The region is already suffering severe water shortages and 
every nation in the region, with the exception of Lebanon, is diagnosed with severe water 
stress. Whether the nations of the Middle East will prefer to wage water wars or not 
remains a real possibility, but better alternatives do exist and can and should be presented 
and promoted, not only to political leaders and decision-makers but also to the general 
public on both sides, as their most vital interests are at stake.  
It is not the objective of this study to identify and analyze the causes, effects or 
potential outcomes of conflict in the Middle East, and the researcher has no interest in 
arguing the rightness or wrongness of historic actions of either side in the conflict. The 
researcher strongly believes that water shortages and other serious and relevant problems 
of water in the region can be transformed into an opportunity for peaceful and mutual 
cooperation among foes. By taking Lebanon and Israel as a case study, the researcher 
hopes to illustrate that peaceful and mutual cooperation can be possible, even in the 
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absence of cooperation, and that such cooperation may constitute the ground for future 
steps toward a final and permanent cooperation.  
1.8. Proposed Possible Resolution Model 
 
The proposed possible water resolution model is still in the process of 
development at this stage, but it is based on the following concepts and principles:  
o Cost-benefit assessment for various parties, focusing not only on the economic costs and 
benefits, but also on the social, political and other economic consequences of 
cooperation, non-cooperation and violent conflict scenarios.  
o The virtual water model and how the collective implementation of such a model can 
provide the actors involved with massive and diverse benefits that exceed any possible 
gains that may be attained by any conflict-based alternative. 
o A project of the benefits of a cooperation-based model in the short, medium and long 
terms.  
1.9. Structure of the Study 
 
In addition to this chapter, the study will also include four other chapters. Chapter 
2 will discuss the issue of water from the perspective of nationhood and its relevant 
ideologies with an emphasis on how Arab, Lebanese and Israeli national ideologies have 
contributed to the definition of water as a national resource and as a cause of conflict. 
Chapter 3 will present and assess the various water resolution models that have been 
proposed and/or implemented in various parts of the world including the Middle East, in 
addition to presenting the water resolution model proposed by the researcher. Chapter 4 
aims at discussing the potentials of transforming national ideologies in the region 
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(especially in Lebanon and Israel) in a manner that will reinforce the success potentials of 
the proposed water resolution model and also with the objective of improving the 
potentials of cooperation in the future. Chapter 5 will be a conclusion of the study, but it 
will also present recommendations to the different sides of the conflict and reference to 
the potential role of third parties in supporting the water resolution model and the 
cooperation process, such parties including other states, international governmental 
organizations (IGOs) and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).  
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CHAPTER TWO 
II­ NATIONAL IDEOLOGIES IN ISRAEL & LEBANON &   
THE CENTRALITY OF WATER 
2.1. Introduction 
 
The main objective of this chapter is to present the prevailing national ideologies 
in Israel and Lebanon and to discuss the centrality of water as an issue of national 
ideology for both parties. Naturally, water as a scarce resource for many countries is 
considered a matter of national security for many countries, but in the Middle East, one 
of the most water-impoverished regions in the world, water sources are of extreme 
importance. Additionally, water in the Middle East is not just an issue of national 
security, but, as this chapter will argue, it is also a matter of defining national identities 
and ideologies, both for Israel and its neighbors, particularly Lebanon. The first part of 
this chapter will define and identify the question of water in the Israeli national ideology 
whereas the second part will present the Lebanese point of view.  
2.2. Water and the Zionist Ideology 
 
Since the beginning of the transfer of Jewish immigrants to Palestine, the Zionist 
movement had focused on obtaining control of agricultural land and ensuring that Jewish 
settlers had access to water resources. With the Balfour Declaration in 1917 which 
constituted an official promise by Great Britain that Palestine would be a homeland for 
the Jews, the efforts of the Zionist movement and its associated organizations became 
more focused on obtaining, controlling and exploiting water resources. According to 
Frederiksen (2009), for over nine decades, the main objective of the Zionist movement 
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was “to garner control of the water resources of Palestine and some of those belonging to 
neighboring riparians [sic] as a means to attain a quite different goal: ownership of all 
Palestine” (p.78).  
At first, there seems to be a major flaw in Frederiksen’s argument, namely the 
link between the control of water resources and the ownership of all Palestine. The 
argument stipulates that control over water resources will result in the control of territory. 
Logically, however, it is the control of territory that is essential for the foundation and 
establishment of statehood. As Berck and Lipow (1994) indicate, however, several 
factors have made water such a priority in the history and formation of the Jewish state, 
essentially turning Israel into what Kartin (2000) refers to as “the sacred shrine of water” 
(p.98).  
To start with, the formation of Israel and its transformation into statehood is 
different from any other experience known in modern times. The foundation of the 
Zionist state was based on transferring immigrants from Europe and other parts of the 
world and permanently locating them in Palestine, the historic Jewish homeland.    This 
process was initiated by the Zionist movement in the late 19th century. But despite 
enjoying international sympathy and support, several obstacles had to be curtailed from 
the outset. The first obstacle was attaining territorial control, and this was accomplished 
through a variety of peaceful means, such as the purchase of land, and eventually violent 
means such as military conquest. The second obstacle was the presence of local Arab 
Palestinian populations that had been attached to the land for centuries, and which 
enjoyed support and sympathy from neighboring Arab countries and populations. The 
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third obstacle was nation-building and promoting the ideology of nationhood and national 
affiliation in the populations of settling immigrants (De-Shalit, 1995).  
For the founding fathers of the Jewish State, attaining control of the land in 
Palestine was only one major challenge. A much bigger challenge, however, was to 
establish a sense of statehood among the Jewish immigrants, to promote their permanent 
connection to the land, and to reinforce the permanent Jewish presence on the ground 
against the demographic threat represented by the fact that the territory was shared by 
local Arab Palestinian populations and neighbored by other hostile Arab states and 
nations to the south, north and east. The solution devised by the Zionist ideologists to 
meet these challenges was the focus on agriculture. According to Kartin (2000), 
agriculture in the Zionist mindset was not just an economic activity, but also a process of 
socialization and nation-building. Since the early efforts of settling Jewish immigrants, 
the Zionist movement vehemently focused on transforming agriculture into a highly-
symbolic value associated with the deeply rooted values of Judaism and Jewish existence. 
De-Shalit (1995) moreover adds that agriculture and agricultural activity were 
transformed into fundamental ideological symbols that literally defined the Jewish state 
and society for most of the twentieth century and for several decades immediately after 
the establishment of Israel in 1948.  
Berck and Lipow (1994) argue that the importance of agriculture in the Zionist 
ideology was essentially driven by the Israeli-Arab struggle, pointing out that cultivating 
and irrigating the land were the only effective means by which the Zionist movement 
could reinforce the bond between the settlers and the land in a politically and 
demographically hostile environment.  
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Kartin (2000) identifies three specific strategic objectives that justified the 
unusual emphasis of the Zionist ideology on agricultural activity as a defining factor in 
the history of the Jewish state. First of all, agriculture was seen as the best means to 
establish a bond between the settlers and the land, an objective that was of great 
importance since the Jewish settlers had come from different ethnic, cultural and 
geographic backgrounds and were only bound by religious affiliation and the dream of 
returning to the “Promised Land”. The second objective was to shape the character of 
Jewish settlers on the individual level, focusing on the fine and firm combination of 
farmer and warrior. The third objective was to reinforce and demonstrate territorial 
sovereignty and ascendancy since agriculture was perceived as the ultimate form of 
connection to the land and demonstrating permanent control over it. Thus for example, 
the Jewish state invested heavily in the development of the village of Even Mehanem, 
supplying it with water near the Lebanese border despite the complete lack of water 
resources in that area, and simply because Zionist leaders believed that the lack of Jewish 
presence in that region constituted a form of abandoning the land. Abandoning the land, 
from the Zionist ideological perspective, would be an unfathomable undertaking.  
Given these historic, political and ideological concerns, agriculture, became a 
paramount national and ideological factor that was defined by the Zionist ideology, but 
which in turn became a defining factor of the Zionist and Israeli identity. According to 
Newman (2002), while the control of territory constituted the tangible dimension of the 
Zionist ideology in the conflict with the Arabs, agriculture and water constituted the 
symbolic dimension which “explains the deep sense of attachment felt by groups to the 
territory within which they reside and which is perceived as eternally theirs” (p.633).  
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In other words, while acquiring and controlling territory through peaceful or other 
means was relatively easy for the Zionist movement and its supporting groups on the 
ground, the real challenge was in establishing a sense of nationhood that permanently 
linked the settlers and citizens of the new nation to the land. It is for this reason that 
agriculture, and consequently water, had to attain such an unusual historical, religious, 
ethical, mythological and political importance in the Zionist ideology (Newman, 2002).  
The importance of water, however, was not only limited to the ideological and 
symbolic dimension of state- and nation-building in Israel. It was also a matter of 
survival. According to Frederisken (2009), at the time of Israel’s inception in 1948, Israel 
controlled no more than 5% of the waters of the River Jordan. From the beginning, the 
political leaders of Israel realized that such a fact constituted a serious threat to the 
national security of a new state that was formed by war and that was already in a state of 
an ongoing war with its neighbors. In this sense, control over water sources was a 
strategic national, political and security priority for survival since, as Frederiksen (2009) 
further adds, “The control of water could be a devastating weapon in Middle East 
conflicts” (p.77).  
In 1967, Israel successfully launched a surprising and devastating six-day war 
against Egypt, Syria and Jordan. At the time, Israeli political and military leaders justified 
their decision to go to war by a number of factors such as the rising tensions with Egypt 
and Syria, the Egyptian claim of acquiring new offensive missile systems, and other 
excuses, all which aimed to portray the war as an act of preemptive self-defense. 
Frederisksen (2009), however, argues that the real objective of this war was to expand 
Israel’s control over the major water sources in the region, especially the fresh water 
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aquifer in the West Bank which at the time was under the administrative control of 
Jordan, and the Golan Heights, which was always Syrian territory and had never the 
subject of any Israeli territorial claims before the eruption of the military activities in 
1967.  
Frederisksen (2009) also points out that decades later, the former Israeli Prime 
Minister Menachim Begin confessed that the 1967 War had nothing to do with the 
Egyptian threats, which Israel considered unrealistic and tenuous, “but as a cover to 
occupy the Golan Heights and the rest of Palestine” (p.78).  
2.3. Water in the Lebanese Ideology 
 
Despite the difficulties and circumstances that accompanied the formation of the 
Lebanese state in 1924, and eventually its independence in 1943,1 Lebanon did not have 
to go through a struggle similar to that witnessed in Israel as part of its state formation. 
Lebanon’s territories and borders have, to a great extent, been mapped and recognized 
internationally, sparing it the problems of border disputes that continue to characterize 
political and diplomatic relations in the region. More importantly, unlike its Jewish 
neighbor and the majority of the nations in the Middle East, Lebanon enjoys significant 
water resources as a result of its rivers, creeks and rich mountainous environment, not to 
mention the relatively high levels of annual rainfall.  
Lebanon, however, has never maintained a consistent national ideology, a factor 
that is often considered, among others, responsible for the weakness of the central state 
and the continuous eruption of domestic and regional violence in this small country. For 
                                                 
1 Lebanon was originally envisioned as a homeland for the Maronite Christians and it was only in 2009 that 
Syria finally made a clear statement that it had no historic claims to Lebanon, a declaration that was 
followed by the unprecedented step of exchanging diplomatic missions for the first time ever.  
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example, Lebanon was among the Arab nations that fought the Zionist project in 1948 
and among those who signed the 1949 Armistice with Israel. Yet, the Lebanese state had 
always distinguished itself from other Arab countries with respect to the conflict with 
Israel in two ways. First, given Lebanon’s small population and limited military 
capabilities, it considered itself as a state of support rather than as a state of confrontation 
in the Arab-Israel conflict, and hence was not expected to participate directly in military 
campaigns against the Jewish State. Thus, for example, Lebanon did not participate in the 
1967 and 1973 wars between Israel and its Arab neighbors despite the fact that it shares 
its entire southern border and part of its eastern border with Israel. The second factor was 
the acknowledgement by Arab leaders that Lebanon had a unique political and 
demographic structure in the Middle East, and hence the need to spare it the burdens of 
the Arab-Israeli conflict. This was particularly maintained in 1958 following the eruption 
of the first Lebanese civil war with the historic meeting between Egypt’s President 
Gamal Abdul-Nasser and the Lebanese President at the time, Fuad Chehab. Despite this 
agreement, however, the Lebanese remained essentially divided politically, with the 
majority of the Muslims calling for Lebanon’s involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict to 
support the Palestinian cause, and the majority of the Lebanese Christians insisting that 
Lebanon maintain a neutral status and be spared the consequences of such involvement.  
Given these divisions and the complications of Lebanese domestic politics, 
Lebanon’s strategy with respect to the water issue since 1949 has been what Khalifeh 
(2008) defines as the strategy of passivity or impotence (p.81). On the one hand, 
Lebanese official and unofficial discourses had always referred to the country’s water 
sources as its “blue gold” (Khalifeh, 2008, p.83), but at the same time, the official 
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position of the state was always that Lebanon neither enjoyed excess waters nor suffered 
a water deficit.  
Given the scarcity of data and statistics on Lebanon’s water resources for decades, 
such an official claim often went uncontested. Effectively, however, there was consensus 
among water experts in Lebanon, as well as in other neighboring countries, that such 
claims were unfounded. However, Khalifeh (2008) attributes such claims to a number of 
strategic and ideological factors. First of all, by making the claim that Lebanon neither 
suffered a deficit in its water nor enjoyed excess supplies, the Lebanese state was 
attempting to adopt a preemptive but passive strategy to prevent Israel from making any 
claims to its waters, especially those close to the Israeli border or those in close proximity 
to the flow of the River Jordan. Since many of these water sources were unused or 
underutilized, Lebanese officials always feared that Israel would eventually mobilize the 
international community, initiate military action, or attempt in other ways to secure 
access to those water sources that are arguably of greater value to Israeli settlers in the 
north than they are to Lebanon’s southern and southeastern regions. Indeed, such fears 
were not unfounded as Israeli politicians expressed the need to annex the Lebanese River 
Litani to the stream of the River Jordan, especially since Lebanon’s use of its flow was 
almost nonexistent (Shapland, 1997; Khalifeh, 2008).  
In the late 1960s, and especially after the Six-Day War which resulted in 
displacing hundreds of thousands of Palestinians from the West Bank, following by the 
expulsion of Palestinian militants from Jordan in 1970, Lebanon came under tremendous 
political pressure from its Arab neighbors to support the Palestinian cause by hosting 
Palestinian militants on its territories. Despite Lebanon’s domestic political and 
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ideological cleavages over this issue, Palestinian militants were ultimately hosted in 
South Lebanon and other parts of the country. This Palestinian presence resulted in 
continuous skirmishes with Israel, the weakening of the central Lebanese state and 
eventually the outbreak of a long and devastating civil war that lasted from 1975 to 1990. 
In 1978, Israel launched Operation Litani which aimed at eradicating the Palestinian 
presence in South Lebanon. The fact that the Israeli troops stopped at the River Litani and 
the fact that the operation was named after the river itself aroused deeply-rooted 
suspicions regarding Israel’s interests in Lebanon’s waters (Naff & Matson, 1984; 
Khalifeh, 2008).  
With the limited success of Operation Litani, Israel launched another extensive 
invasion in 1982 which, at its peak, resulted in the occupation of Beirut before the Israeli 
troops were withdrawn to South Lebanon. With this partial withdrawal, the Israeli 
presence maintained an occupied security belt that provided Israel with control over 
several rivers such as the Litani, Hasbani and Wazzani, not to mention other underground 
sources of water. While the Israeli invasion successfully ended the problem of the 
Palestinian military presence in South Lebanon, it resulted in the emergence of new 
forces of resistance to the Israeli presence, especially the Iranian-backed organization that 
eventually transformed into Hezbollah in 1982.           In 2000, and after a long war of 
attrition in South Lebanon, Israel finally withdrew to its internationally-recognized 
borders. This state of affairs has basically remained unchanged since then, despite the 33-
day war in 2006 between Israel and Hezbollah which resulted in international 
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intervention through the presence of a reinvigorated international peacekeeping force 2 in 
South Lebanon (Khalifeh, 2008).  
Throughout these years of political instability, Lebanon’s national ideology in 
general, and with respect to the water issue in particular, seemed to go through a number 
of variations and transformations. For example, on the official level, the Lebanese state 
and most political leaders, as well as water experts, held on to the state’s classic passive 
strategy which on the one hand claimed that water was Lebanon’s untapped gold, but on 
the other hand claimed that Lebanon neither enjoyed a water excess nor suffered a water 
deficit. At the same time, Lebanese officials and politicians continuously accused Israel 
of water piracy.  
Such accusations constituted an important element of the Lebanese ideology and 
strategy. To start with, given the Israeli military occupation, Lebanese politicians and 
experts had virtually no access to investigate the occurrence of such Israeli piracy, except 
from the scant reports by local residents. Secondly, Israeli politicians often referred to 
Lebanon’s waters as a possible viable resource and solution for the water scarcity 
problems in the northern regions of Israel, but at the same time the Israeli government 
never took any serious political or technical steps toward developing a water policy in the 
occupied Lebanese territories. This is in sharp contrast with the 1981 declaration of the 
permanent annexation of the Golan Heights by the Israeli Knesset, a controversial step 
that has never been acknowledged or accepted by the international community or from 
the perspective of international law (Khalifeh, 2008).  
                                                 
2 Please note that the United Nations interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) has been present long before the 
2006 war, its mandate was simply strengthened after the 33-day war.  
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Hence, except for a few limited incidents where the Israeli army actually installed 
pumps at river streams and wells for various usages, there seems to be no evidence of 
serious Israeli attempts to transform the flow of any of the Lebanese rivers during the 
years of the occupation. This may have also been attributed to a number of factors such 
as the continuous attacks by Hezbollah militants, the hostility of local residents and 
various other factors that may have made it extremely difficult and costly for Israel to 
consider such projects. In all cases, Lebanese officials and politicians continued to accuse 
Israel of water piracy and repeatedly raised this issue in international forums, 
occasionally resulting in investigations by UN envoys of such activities. Apparently, 
these complaints and accusations were aimed at achieving several objectives. The first 
objective was to impose as much political and diplomatic pressure on Israel to undermine 
any possible attempts by Israel to actually consider changing the flow of any of 
Lebanon’s rivers into its territories or to install any significant projects on these rivers 
and other water sources. The second objective was to support Lebanon’s territorial claims 
in South Lebanon in support of UN Resolution 425, which had called for the withdrawal 
of foreign troops from Lebanese territories, and to reinforce international pressure to 
prevent Israel from considering the possibility of annexing South Lebanon to its 
territories as it did with the Golan Heights (Khalifeh, 2008).  
However, apart from these political steps and accusations, the Lebanese state did 
not really have a clear strategy regarding its water sources as per the conflict with Israel. 
More importantly, aside from the fact that the majority of water sources in Lebanon 
remained underutilized or poorly exploited, water did not seem to constitute an element 
of the Lebanese national ideology (Khalifeh, 2008). Interestingly, however, the 
 28
ascendance of Hezbollah as the primary military, political and social power in South 
Lebanon in the 1980s and 1990s tapped the question of water and considered it a matter 
of national security and ideology.  
In the early 1980s, Hezbollah emerged as a local extremist Muslim Shiite group 
that attracted recruits from the Shiite villages in South Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley in 
the east. The organization enjoyed direct and extensive financial, political and military 
support from the Islamic Republic of Iran. To gain local legitimacy and overcome the 
accusation that Hezbollah was in effect a militant arm of Iran in Lebanon, Hezbollah 
capitalized on a number of steps and factors to prove otherwise. For example, it 
established numerous social and economic institutions that served the local communities 
at a time when the state was virtually nonexistent. Secondly, it gained significant 
legitimacy from its successful guerilla war against the Israeli occupation in the South at a 
time when many believed that the Israeli presence there would eventually become 
permanent as the case seemed to be in other occupied territories such as the West Bank 
and the Golan Heights. More importantly, however, Hezbollah raised the water issue as 
an element of national ideology and as a central theme to its political activity. The 
transformation of the water issue from a minor element into such a major issue in 
Hezbollah’s discourse can be traced to a number of factors (Shapira & Minzili, 2009).  
First of all, the water issue was often a question in which local farmers and 
residents had accused the Lebanese state of showing no real interest or serious 
consideration. Secondly, local communities in South Lebanon had for years, even long 
before the Israeli occupation, accused the Lebanese state of neglecting them and their 
socio-economic interests. The Green Project at Litani River, for example, was often the 
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subject of sarcasm among local residents since it was announced in the 1950s as the 
largest and most important developmental project that would change the economic and 
social face of the region, but in reality was never materialized by the state. Thirdly, aside 
from accusing Israel of committing water piracy in the south, the Lebanese state had 
never really taken any practical steps to secure its water interests, and its strategy had 
always been a passive one based on the claim that Lebanon had no excess waters to share 
or offer. Hezbollah’s leaders, however, identified the sensitivity of the water issue and 
embarked on transforming it into a pillar of their ideology (Shapira & Minzili, 2009).  
Hence, in several of his speeches before the Israel withdrawal in 2000, 
Hezbollah’s Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah referred to Israel’s interests in 
Lebanon’s waters and its piracy of Lebanon’s water sources. At the same time, however, 
he announced that Hezbollah’s struggle against Israel would not stop at the liberation of 
the land and the people, but also at liberating water sources and ensuring that Israel had 
no access to these sources whether they were over the ground or underground. In part, 
such announcements resulted in raising awareness about the importance of the water 
issue among the Lebanese public, but they also constituted part of Hezbollah’s strategy to 
gain legitimacy not only among their local Shiite constituencies in the occupied territories 
in South Lebanon and in the Bekaa Valley, but also among the general Lebanese public. 
In effect, this was part of Hezbollah’s strategy to replace the legitimacy of the state in 
those regions by its own presence and power (Shapira & Minzili, 2009).  
Even with the Israeli military’s withdrawal in 2000, Hezbollah’s politburo 
continued to refer to Israel’s interests in and claims to Lebanese waters. Although the 
Israeli presence on the ground was no longer existent, such reference to water security 
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seems to have been primarily motivated by Hezbollah’s domestic agenda for the future. 
Indeed, a decade after the Israeli withdrawal from the occupied Lebanese territories, 
Hezbollah continues to use the water issue, among others, as an excuse to justify its 
existence as the only military organization outside the control of the Lebanese state 
(Shapira & Minzili, 2009).  
In simple terms, the argument is that the Lebanese state has never been able to 
maintain the water security of the nation but that Hezbollah has been successful in this 
respect and will continue to be so as long as it remains armed and in practical control of 
the territories in South Lebanon (Shapira & Minzili, 2009).  
Without dwelling deeper into Lebanese domestic politics, the ascendance of the 
water issue as a result of Hezbollah’s discourse and actions in the past three decades has 
resulted in a number of important transformations with respect to the Lebanese national 
ideology.  
First of all, water has become a matter of national security and priority in the 
mind of many Lebanese for the first time. Secondly, water was transformed into an issue 
of conflict with Israel, whereas for decades many, if not most, Lebanese accepted the idea 
that Israel did not have any conflict-causing interests or claims in Lebanon’s territories or 
its other resources. Thirdly, whereas in the past Lebanon’s national ideology considered 
that Lebanon did not have enough waters to result in conflict with Israel, the current 
ideology that is shared by Hezbollah and most Lebanese politicians today holds otherwise 
that Lebanon’s water sources constitute a primary issue of conflict and is a matter over 
which the Lebanese are willing to go to war.  
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2.4. National Ideologies versus Water Realities 
 
Reinforced with symbols, deeply-rooted political and historic values, myths and 
various other elements, even the most irrational of national ideologies have often proven 
to be resilient in the face of political, economic and social realities and needs on the 
ground. It is such resilience that has enabled national ideologies such as Zionism in 
Israel, Arab nationalism, and different varieties of Islamic fundamentalist ideologies to 
survive in the Middle East. Water realities, however, constitute a unique challenge to 
national ideologies because they pay no heed to national, political, security, economic, 
social or other interests. As this chapter has illustrated, the political players in the region 
have resorted to a variety of politics and actions to circumvent the realities of the water 
factor. For example, Lebanon exaggerated its water scarcity for decades while enjoying 
an abundance of the resource, and in later stages, the emergence of Hezbollah as a force 
on the ground gave way to the possibility of a military option as a means to maintain 
Lebanese water interests. Similarly, Israel emphasized agriculture as a national, political, 
economic and social activity with significant symbolic value, and when this option 
clashed with water realities, the Jewish state resorted to military conquest to acquire 
additional water sources in 1967.  
Whatever solutions had worked in the past, however, are highly unlikely to 
succeed in the future. To start with, the abundance of Lebanon’s waters in an arid region 
such as the Middle East will sooner or later raise political, economic and international 
legal questions as to the rights of neighboring states to access and exploit those water 
sources, especially if these waters are left to waste. Similarly, Israel cannot rest on its 
laurels as the Palestinians continue to exert political and legal pressure on the Israeli 
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government to gain bigger access and usage rights with respect to the fresh water aquifer 
in the West Bank, which according to international law remains an occupied Palestinian 
territory. Similar issues face Israel with respect to the Golan Heights which Israel will 
have to consider returning to Syria as part of any future peaceful resolution between the 
two countries. This leads to a number of important assumptions in this study as will be 
argued and discussed in the coming chapters: 
o Water realities will become impossible to avoid in the next fifty years as a result of 
population growth and the expansion of industrial and urban water needs, not to mention 
the dependence of the region on water-inefficient agricultural activities.  
o Whereas Lebanon continues to enjoy abundance in water sources, the majority of its 
water supplies remain untapped, even despite the country’s ongoing urban water shortage 
crisis in summer times every year.  
o The option of military conquest is next to impossible, especially in light of the extremely 
high cost of military confrontations as became evident during the 2006 War between 
Israel and Hezbollah in South Lebanon.  
o Simply put, the state actors can neither maintain the status quo nor change it through the 
conventional solutions established in their mindsets, namely with respect to military 
solutions or relying on costly technology such as desalination. Accordingly, their only 
realistic solution is to explore unconventional frameworks of cooperation that result in 
much higher and more productive yields.  
2.5. Conclusion 
Historically, the Zionist ideology of the Jewish State has, since its inception 
considered water as a matter of national security and a most basic element of nation- and 
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state-building, particularly with respect to its centrality to agricultural activity which for 
historic, religious, political and symbolic reasons has been considered a priority in the 
formation of the Israeli identity and in bonding the population to the land. In contrast, at 
least until the early 1990s, Lebanon’s national ideology did not accord such importance 
to water and the Lebanese strategy had been one of passive preemption; that is, a strategy 
that aimed at disinteresting any Israeli claims in Lebanon’s waters. This ideology, 
however, was effectively transformed during the Israeli occupation of South Lebanon and 
consequently as a result of the ascendance of Hezbollah as the dominant political force in 
that region, and eventually within the Lebanese state. As a result, the issue of water in the 
Lebanese national ideology constitutes a priority and a major potential cause for going to 
war or entering a violent confrontation with Israel.  
Yet, just as the dominant national and political ideologies in Lebanon and Israel 
both prioritize the water issue and consider it a matter of utmost importance from the 
perspective of national security, water realities will sooner or later clash with the 
assumptions and intentions of these ideologies. Chapter 4 in particular, will show how 
this clash is inevitable and that the national ideologies in both countries will have to 
accommodate the new realities of water, because even the most extreme of solutions (e.g 
the military option) may simply fail to provide either side with adequate solutions to their 
water needs.  
The next chapter of this study presents a number of available water-conflict 
resolution models that have been proposed or implemented successfully in the past. The 
chapter also presents a number of theoretical and hypothetical frameworks that are 
proposed as grounds for a potential long-term-oriented solution for the water conflict 
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between Lebanon and Israel. In a nutshell, the next chapter is an attempt at presenting the 
variety of available possible solutions upon which cooperation efforts can be initiated, 
using the existing or potential water conflicts between the two countries as a catalyst to 
pursue cooperation.  
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CHAPTER THREE  
III ­ POTENTIAL WATER MODELS TO PROMOTE 
COOPERATION BETWEEN LEBANON & ISRAEL 
3.1. Introduction  
 
The objective of this chapter is to present and discuss the potential water models 
that may contribute to transforming the scarcity of water sources from a possible cause of 
armed conflict between Lebanon and Israel into a means to create opportunities for 
promoting peace between the two countries. This view is based on a number of 
assumptions that have been discussed in previous chapters. First of all, the view assumes 
that water scarcity in the Middle East is a serious issue that threatens the political, 
economic and social systems in the Middle East. The second assumption is that 
conventional means may no longer be viable in the future, especially as water scarcity 
problems become too acute in the long term. The third assumption is that regionally-
integrated and cooperation-based models yield better outcomes and consequences for the 
communities in the region, especially when compared to conventional unilateral and 
military options. Most importantly, this chapter will argue that conventional solutions and 
models may no longer be sufficient to achieve effective solutions in the Middle East and 
that countries such as Lebanon and Israel must start considering unconventional 
solutions, transforming water scarcity as a window of opportunity to initiate and achieve 
peaceful solutions.  
This chapter will first reflect on the current situation and future expectations, as 
well as the options currently available for Lebanon and Israel. The second part of the 
chapter will discuss and critique the different water models that may contribute to 
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peaceful outcomes, with emphasis on Allan’s Virtual Water model. Ultimately, this 
chapter will provide the theoretical and practical framework for the construction of a 
cooperation-based model that will be recommended at the end of this study.  
3.2. Current Challenges 
 
The current water situation in the Middle East as a whole can be best described as 
a situation of ongoing and chronic crisis, or as Azar, Juredini and McLaunn (1978) 
described it “a protracted conflict” that is characterized by the absence of a 
distinguishable point of termination (Quoted in Kartin, 2000, p.107). This current 
situation is further characterized by the severe limited availability of water resources 
which is coupled with a rapid increase in population and equally rising water needs.  
3.2.1. Water Realities 
 
This is not surprising given the fact that the countries of the region have run out of 
renewable fresh water sources since the 1970s, and at the same time their populations 
have been increasing dramatically. According to Drake (2000), the region had a 
population of 60 million only in 1950, but by 1999, the population had exceeded 300 
million and it is expected to double to 600 million by 2035. At the same time, however, 
the already insufficient water supplies have been decreasing both in quantity and quality.  
Qadir et al. (2007), for example, argue that in today’s world a volume of 1,000 
cubic meters per capita is perceived as critical for any nation, whereas an average of 
about 2,000 cubic meters per capita is needed to attain a comfortable standard of living 
for the respective population. Against these requirements, the realities on the ground in 
the Middle East are quite harsh. For example, in 2005 Lebanon maintained average per 
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capita renewable water resources of 1,170 cubic meters, a figure estimated to decline to 
938 cubic meters by 2030, well below the critical threshold of 1,000 cubic meters posed 
by Qadir et al. In Israel, the situation is several times worse, with 254 cubic meters per 
capita in 2005 further estimated to drop to the severely low level of 190 cubic meters by 
2030. Frederikson (2003) also points out that this situation is further complicated by the 
political, military and other factors which prevent several countries in the region from 
using their renewable water resources efficiently. Drake (2000) also illustrates these 
geopolitical charms by noting that over 50% of Israel’s water flow is shared with its 
neighbors.  
3.2.2. Limitations on Available Options 
 
The current water situation in the region imposes a number of serious limitations 
on the governments and societies of the region. Lebanon, for example, is the only country 
in the region with excess water resources at present, but it has suffered a chronic water 
problem as a result of several factors such as poor planning and utilization of water 
resources, civil war and political instability (Khalifeh, 2008). Additionally, Lebanon also 
suffers the inability to use most of its water resources in South Lebanon as a result of 
repeated outbreaks of hostilities with Israel. For example, Wessels (2009) refers to the 
fact that in 2002, the Lebanese government announced its intention to make use of 315 
million cubic meters of water flows from the Wazzani and Hasbani Rivers. Although 
both rivers fall within the Lebanese territories, the Lebanese government had to postpone 
its plans indefinitely as Israeli Prime Minister at the time, Ariel Sharon, announced that 
such plans would constitute ground for war between the two countries.  
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Israel, on the other hand, has been much more successful than Lebanon in 
exercising control over its extremely limited water resources. It has also resorted to 
military conquest and expansion to attain control over most of the flows from the River 
Jordan as well as the major aquifers in the West Bank. However, such solutions have 
proven to be less than optimal for a number of reasons. First of all, they have kept Israel 
in a state of ongoing hostility and complicated the possibility of cooperation with its 
neighbors. Secondly, Syria and the Palestinians have not given up on their rights in 
shared water resources and the possibility of the outbreak of violence over these water 
sources remains a constant possibility. Further complicating the matter is that, even with 
its campaigns of military expansion, Israel has only been able to secure part of its water 
needs. Hence, in the long run, Israel will be facing another serious water shortage 
problem.  
In the face of water shortages, countries in the Middle East have often considered 
the possibility of relying on conventional solutions. Qadir et al. (2007) for example, refer 
to desalination techniques, a solution that has been pursued by Israel. Other possible 
solutions include seawater reverse osmosis processes, rainfall harvesting and the physical 
transportation of freshwater from water-rich countries. Frederiksen (2009), however, 
argues that such simple and unilateral solutions are unlikely to work for developing 
countries facing chronic and severe water shortage problems, not only because of the 
massive capacity of water needs that such solutions may not be able to provide, but also 
because of the enormous investment levels that these countries are unable to afford. 
Similarly, Drake (2000), points out that some solutions such as water desalination can 
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only be effective for specific purposes but are associated with very high costs, 
environmental harm and limited effectiveness for water-shortage problem solving.  
Drake (2000) points out that administrative solutions can be useful in the short 
term, such as in reducing the allocation of water resource for certain activities pertaining 
to agriculture and irrigation which consume the majority of water supplies in the region. 
However, Isaac (2000) admits that such solutions may be impossible to attain in a 
country such as Israel, at least in the short term, because agriculture is associated with 
sensitive political, ideological, cultural and symbolic values that touch on the dimension 
of national security. More specifically, Fishelson (1994) argues that Israel must reduce 
the allocation of water to agricultural activities by at least 25% to better manage its water 
shortage problem in the short term, a goal that is politically impossible. Likewise, large 
communities still rely on agriculture and irrigation in Lebanon, making it difficult to 
consider such significant structural shifts in economic activities in a short period of time 
(Khalifeh, 2008).  
3.3. Potential Water Models 
 
Given the persistence and frequency of water crises in many parts of the world, a 
variety of water models have been proposed over the years. These models vary according 
to their assumptions as well as their objectives. One common category of models may be 
classified as unilateral, whereas others may be classified as multilateral and cooperative.  
3.3.1. Unilateral Models 
 
Unilateral models are generally based on traditional assumptions of sovereignty, 
especially territorial sovereignty and the rights and abilities of nations to use water 
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resources on their territories to achieve political, economic, social and other objectives. 
Examples of this model have already been discussed in this and previous chapters, but in 
a nutshell, they can be described as solutions pursued by an individual state to 
accomplish goals to address water shortage problems. Solutions under this model include 
efforts to balance water demand and supply through administrative solutions; these 
include efforts to increase supply through water importation, water desalination and 
processing, reuse of water, cloud seeding, and the reduction of demand (Shapland, 1997).  
Problematically, however, unilateral models suffer from a number of weaknesses. 
Firstly, they are far from adequate when considered in countries that suffer from severe 
chronic water shortage problems, as is the case in the Middle East. Secondly, the cost-
effectiveness of such solutions is highly questionable, especially when considering the 
massive water needs that must be covered by these solutions, as is the case in water-
impoverished countries in the Middle East. Thirdly, various political, economic and 
social considerations are often stumbling blocks that prevent the effective implementation 
of such solutions. For example, although Israel is successfully using the water flows of 
the River Jordan and the underground water in the West Bank aquifer, political conflict, 
possible military action and legal claims by other actors continuously loom over such 
water utilization efforts, raising serious questions about the viability of such solutions in 
the future.  
3.3.2. Multilateral/Cooperative Models 
 
Unlike unilateral models, which are based on the ability of governments to initiate 
and execute actions and plans within their boundaries, multilateral models take a more 
comprehensive approach to the management of water shortage issues, often involving 
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integrated approaches and the involvement of the various riparian parties affected by any 
plans or actions with respect to the use of various water sources.  
At the heart of multilateral and cooperative models of resolving water issues is the 
assumption that nations are willing to cooperate to resolve their conflicts over water. 
Piscoli and Wolf (2009) refer to the functionality theory of international politics which 
holds that states are willing to transfer sovereignty over matters of public concern to a 
common authority. In fact, this is exactly what Israel and several Arab states did in the 
1950s when they partially transferred their sovereignty to the US as an independent 
negotiator in what became known as the Johnson negotiations over the River Jordan 
(Clawson, 2008). Ultimately, these talks and negotiations collapsed as neither Israel nor 
the Arab states involved had any real interest in cooperation at the time, especially as 
political leaders on both sides truly believed that military options could yield better 
results for their nations. Similarly, Ali (2008) argues that peaceful relations are not a 
prerequisite for achieving cooperative peaceful solutions and agreements over water. For 
example, sworn enemies such as Pakistan and India have successfully negotiated, 
executed and maintained a comprehensive agreement over the River Indus, and the 
agreement has withstood the challenge of repeated hostilities and wars between the two 
countries and continues to stand today. 
In fact, although the Arab-Israeli conflict is considered to be both chronic and 
endless by many, the fact remains that Arab states and Israel have on a number of 
occasions negotiated openly and secretly over water. Additionally, the two sides 
repeatedly address water issues whenever the possibility of cooperative negotiations is 
raised. However, unlike negotiations over territories and other interests of national 
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concern, negotiations over water, according to Bencala and Dabelko (2008) require a 
transition in the mindset of the parties involved in the bargaining and negotiation process. 
The first phase starts with the traditional assessment of respective water rights by the 
different actors. In the second phase, the actors start identifying and analyzing their needs 
as well as defining the means by which water supplies can meet those needs. In the third 
stage of this transition, the actors remove the political boundaries from the map and start 
searching for constructive ways to share the benefits, thus turning cooperation over water 
into a de facto conflict-prevention tool.  
Even within the context of a chronic, multifaceted conflict such as the Arab-
Israeli struggle, the construction of cooperation-based frameworks on the basis of 
resolving water issues remains a possibility. For example, Gideon Fishelson of the 
Armand Hammer Fund for Economic Cooperation states, “The danger of war over water 
hangs over the heads of the Middle East countries, yet there is also the possibility of 
cooperation and harnessing new technologies and capital that would prevent such wars. 
Solving the water issue is one of the essential prerequisites to achieving a meaningful and 
lasting peace in the Middle East” (Quoted in Drake, 2000, p.303).  
The promotion of multilateral and cooperation-based solutions may require more 
than just the good intentions of the actors involved, however. Frederiksen (2009) argues 
that the international community has a big role to play in the development and promotion 
of such frameworks, especially in cases of major conflicts involving developing 
countries. Parallel to the effective promotion of such frameworks of cooperation, 
international partners must not only provide technical assistance and infrastructure 
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financing, but they must also play a direct role in assisting the actors in negotiating 
peaceful solutions and in developing frameworks bases on mutual cooperation.  
Additionally, international players and intermediaries must also play a direct role 
in the construction of the infrastructure of the river basins and assist the involved parties 
in building the appropriate institutions and facilities that would enable them to develop 
regionally-integrated forms and systems of cooperation over water resources. The 
ultimate objective of these cooperation-based systems is to encourage the conflicting 
actors to acknowledge and maintain joint ownership of benefits (Frederiksen, 2009).  
Similarly, Issar (2008) states several necessary conditions for the success of 
cooperation-based projects between nations to resolve water conflicts and problems. To 
start with, such projects must be comprehensive and their components must be integral on 
the regional level such that the costs and benefits are shared by the different actors. This 
contrasts with the traditional win-lose model which focuses only on maximizing the 
marginal benefits of the individual state. With cooperation-based frameworks, more 
sophisticated projects that yield multiple benefits for various actors become feasible.  
Reaching such a mindset is possible, but only when the political leaders of the 
involved states begin to realize that water ignores political boundaries, and hence 
solutions must also ignore political restrictions and limitations. According to Wolf 
(2008), moving from a zero-sum mindset to the possibility of attaining synergies with 
water solutions requires not only comprehensive solutions, but also the realization that 
“water has an economic value in all its competing uses and should be recognized as an 
economic good” (p.55). In the context of the Middle East, it is noted for example that 
both Lebanon and Israel still perceive water as a resource with more political and 
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symbolic value than as an economic commodity. As a result, a major obstacle to 
approaching shared water issues in the Middle East from a cooperation-based framework 
is that the water conflict between nations such as Lebanon and Israel has become 
“institutionalized” (Barnaby, 2009, p.282).  
Priscoli and Wolf (2009), on the other hand, argue that even with                
deeply-rooted attitudes and hostilities, cooperation over water issues remains possible, 
even if cooperation between the involved actors is unlikely in the foreseeable future. In 
this sense, conflict over water becomes a common bond that the conflicting actors can 
work on to achieve their common goals, possibly transforming this level of cooperation 
into a framework for achieving peaceful agreements over other more complicated aspects 
of the conflict. In such a framework, Priscoli and Wolf (2009) propose a model of four 
stages to transform water conflicts. In the initial change, intermediaries start to focus on 
trust-building between the different parties. In the second stage, the focus is on changing 
perceptions and on bridging the gap between the actors. In the third stage, the emphasis 
focuses on enhancing benefits beyond the immediate outcomes related to the basin or 
shared water flows. The last stage constitutes putting all elements of the solution 
together, focusing mostly on institutionalizing the solution and building organizational 
capacity to make the sharing of benefits both comprehensive and feasible in the long-
term.  
3.4. The Concept of Virtual Water 
 
One of the recent and promising concepts in the field of managing water crises 
and issues is the concept of virtual water, also known as embedded or invisible water. 
The concept was originally developed by Professor J.A. Allan who defined virtual water 
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as the volume of water embodied in food crops that are traded internationally (Wichelns, 
2001). To simply illustrate the concept of virtual water, Allan (1996) argued that states 
and communities tend to diversify their agricultural activities away from water-intensive 
crops to crops that consume less water. For example, since growing one ton of wheat 
requires 1,000 cubic meters of water, an economy can save one billion cubic meters of 
water by importing rather than growing one million tons of wheat. In support of the 
virtual water theory, Wessels (2009) argues that societies such as the Middle East can 
significantly reduce their water shortage problems by diversifying their economic 
activities away from agriculture.  
In fact, Allan (1996) has actually argued that the different countries of the Middle 
East have used virtual water as a means to avoid dealing with their complicated and 
compelling water shortage problems. In other words, these states have taken advantage of 
the low prices of food grains in international markets to import food products rather than 
grow them, thus achieving significant water savings.  
As a concept, Virtual Water Theory has been gaining increased support in various 
parts of the world. In supporting his theory, Allan (1997) argued that “the mechanisms of 
international trade in staple foods continue to operate with proven effectiveness to 
ameliorate the uneven water endowments of the world’s regions.” Kumar and Singh 
(2005) also found evidence of practices based on Virtual Water Theory in 146 countries. 
Additionally, Qadir et al. (2007) have reported findings of strong evidence related to the 
benefits and gains of applying Virtual Water Theory by Middle Eastern countries on the 
southern coast of the Mediterranean.  
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Ansink (2010) attributes the popularity of Virtual Water Theory to two central 
claims inherent in the theory. The first is the claim that virtual water trade will ameliorate 
uneven water distribution by using crops as vehicles of trade through which nations can 
compensate for their water shortages by importing water-intensive crops grown 
elsewhere in regions that are richer in water. The second claim holds that trade in virtual 
water reduces the potential for water conflict, mainly because it provides an opportunity 
for nations to manage their water shortage problems more efficiently through 
international trade arrangements. 
On the other hand, Virtual Water Theory has faced a number of criticisms and 
challenges. To start with, a study by De Fraiture et.al. (2004) has found that the evidence 
of findings attributed to the trade in virtual water may be exaggerated and be leading to 
overly-optimistic conclusions. Similarly, Yang and Zehnder (2007) were unable to find 
sufficient evidence supporting the claim that Virtual Water Theory was widely applied; 
rather, they found that such evidence is strongly present in only a small sample of 
countries. Warner (2003), on the other hand, questioned the entire relationship between 
the international trade practices of nations and Virtual Water Theory, arguing that this 
relationship is not straight forward, and implying that in many cases such benefits are 
incidental. In addition to this, Ansink (2010) has questioned the soundness of Virtual 
Water Theory on the grounds that it does not fit within the traditions of classic economic 
theory, but on the other hand, has accepted that benefits can be explained on the basis of 
this theory.  
The debate over the soundness of Virtual Water Theory will probably continue for 
years as the theory remains relatively new and in need of additional research to verify its 
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claims and assumptions. In principle, however, there is some form of agreement among 
many scholars on what Barnaby (2009) considers the main benefit of this theory, namely 
the tendency and willingness of poorer nations to diversify their economies away from 
agriculture in the hope of creating wealth more efficiently from industries that require 
less use of water.  
However, insofar as this study is concerned, the main problem with Virtual Water 
Theory lies not in its assumptions, but in the framework that it adopts. At the basic level, 
Virtual Water Theory assumes that nations will take steps to manage their water supply 
challenges by importing water-intensive crops rather than growing them, thus 
ameliorating the water shortage problem. This assumption leads to two problems with 
respect to the Middle East crisis.  
First of all, it leads to the conclusion that Virtual Water is unilateral in nature and 
that it does not encourage or invite cooperation among nations. Hence, a nation can 
simply manage its trade in crops to attain water gains without having to cooperate with 
other parties in any way, acting in a virtual vacuum. 
Secondly, the theory leads to the conclusion that nations can escape the need for 
cooperation or consideration of peaceful solutions for their conflicts through the gate of 
water shortage management because they simply do not have to as the virtual water 
model informs decision-makers in these countries that they can solve the water shortage 
problem without having to communicate and cooperate with their neighbors or enemies.  
3.5. Virtual Water & Cooperative Frameworks  
 
One of the central assumptions of this study is that a peaceful future in the Middle 
East, especially between Lebanon and Israel can be attained through cooperation-based 
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frameworks aimed at resolving water shortage problems. The study also assumes that 
Virtual Water Theory is a promising theoretical approach that can be integrated into the 
proposed cooperation-based framework although in essence it may be argued to be of a 
unilateral nature. More specifically, Virtual Water Theory assumptions may be integrated 
into the schemes of regional planning of water management, not only between Lebanon 
and Israel, but also at the regional level since the water flows and its ensuing problems 
cannot be separated on the basis of territorial borders. This approach will be defined in 
greater detail in Chapters 4 and 5.  
3.6. Conclusion 
 
Potential water models to resolve water conflicts and water shortage issues 
between nations can be divided into two broad categories, namely unilateral and 
multilateral/cooperative. The interest of this research is focused on the latter category, 
specifically on schemes that are based on integral regional perspectives and which are 
comprehensive in nature. This chapter has also addressed Virtual Water Theory, which 
may be a promising component of future cooperative solutions in the region.  
In Chapter 4, the study will focus on presenting the necessary changes needed in 
the national ideologies, discourses, attitudes and policies of nations, specifically with 
respect to Lebanon and Israel, to resolve their water issues and start paving the long road 
toward cooperation. The chapter will also discuss a number of creative and innovative 
approaches such as the virtual water model that can enable decision-makers on both sides 
to address their political commitment to unrealistic ideological positions.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
IV­ RECONCILING NATIONAL IDEOLOGIES & REGIONAL 
COOPERATION 
4.1. Introduction 
 
As shown in Chapter 2, water issues occupy a significant position in the national 
ideologies of Israel and Lebanon. In the case of Israel, the use of water, specifically for 
the purposes of irrigation, agriculture and settling on the land, has been considered 
among the most important characteristics and aspects of the Zionist ideology (Drake, 
2000). In contrast, although water issues have only recently started occupying a position 
of similar importance in Lebanon, specifically with the emergence of Hezbollah as a 
political party attempting to impose its political agenda, water is now perceived as a 
matter of great significance for the emerging Lebanese national ideology. In other words, 
both nations have allocated such value and sensitive attributions to the question of water 
that it has transformed into an issue over which they are willing to go to war. On the 
other hand, Chapter 3 proposed a number of models to address water shortage issues in 
Israel and Lebanon, specifically focusing on multilateral models of cooperation and 
presenting them as a superior alternative to the unilateral model in terms of outcomes and 
benefits for the parties involved.  
Hence, whereas the ideological positions described in Chapter 2 perceive water as 
an essential cause of conflict between two ideologies and nations, Chapter 3 offers an 
alternative position that proposes water conflict as a possible path to cooperation aimed at 
the achievement of shared benefits. More specifically, the chapter will revisit the 
ideological positions in both countries and will attempt to explore possible windows of 
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opportunities through which amendments and changes in ideological perspectives and 
positions can be attained in order to promote mutual cooperation.  
The first section of this chapter will discuss the concept and nature of ideologies 
in Lebanon and Israel. The second section will revisit the dominant ideologies in 
Lebanon and Israel from the angle of the water question and will attempt to identify 
potential windows of opportunity through which frameworks of cooperation can be 
introduced and promoted.  
4.2. Ideological Discourses in Lebanon & Israel 
 
In the most general sense, ideology may be defined as a set of beliefs, values and 
objectives that are shared by a group of people. A national ideology, therefore, may be 
defined as the set of beliefs, values and objectives, in addition to the myths and other 
elements and components that in a way define the building blocks of a nation and 
consequently allow the formation of the state that governs the nation. The main objective 
of a national identity is to act as the glue that brings the members of a nation together 
around a common idea that bears emotional, social, cultural or religious values. In 
addition to this, national ideologies often propose a central claim that aims at 
differentiating a specific nation from other groups, thus setting the boundaries with other 
nations. For example, a central claim in the Zionist ideology is based on the religious 
conviction that the Jews are the chosen people of God and that the return of the Jews to 
Palestine as a permanent homeland is a promise which is grounded in the Old Testament 
(Frederiksen, 2009). Irrespective of the accuracy and credibility of such claims, the 
power and effectiveness of ideology lies in the extent to which the members of the 
community are willing to share, promote, preserve, and ultimately act upon it. In this 
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context, the success of Zionism in the establishment of the State of Israel can be primarily 
attributed to the ability of the proponents of this ideology to promote its beliefs, myths 
and objectives among the Jewish communities all over the world despite their numerous 
and substantial cultural, ethnic, and other differences (Kartin, 2002).  
Similarly, Arab nationalism as an ideology was successful in most Arab countries 
for a great part of the twentieth century because it successfully appealed to millions of 
Arab intellectuals who truly believed in the determinism and indispensability of unity 
among all Arab states in North Africa, the Arab Peninsula and the Levant.  
Ideology, moreover, often thrives on the existence of a shared threat or enemy. In 
the case of Zionism, for example, the proponents of the Jewish State were very careful to 
capitalize on the fear of annihilation at the hands of hostile Arab and Muslim neighbors. 
Such fears of annihilation, although unrealistic and almost mythical, were in fact used as 
a means to design, justify and support many of the actions taken by consecutive Israeli 
governments, such as mobilizing national resources for war efforts and pursuing 
unpopular economic policies (Newman, 2002).  
In a similar manner, Arab nationalism and more recently new variations of 
Islamic fundamentalism were able to thrive by exploiting the fear of Western and Zionist 
hegemony. It is in this context that the liberation of Palestine from Jewish occupation 
became a central theme in Arab nationalist discourse as a means to legitimize many Arab 
governments even when, in effect, none of these governments had any intentions of 
waging war against Israel. Accordingly, slogans of national ideologies in Israel, as well 
as in many Arab countries including Lebanon, were generally aimed at consolidating 
power in the hands of ruling elites through the mobilization of national support and 
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resources behind these slogans (a rally-around-the-flag effect) and by maintaining the 
legitimacy of the state and the political groups in control of the state.  
In Israel, Zionism has consistently survived as the dominant national ideology and 
as the driving force behind state policies since the establishment of Israel in 1948. 
Despite the rise of religious and secular challenges both on the right and left extremes of 
the Israeli political spectrum, Zionism and its fundamental principles continue to thrive. 
In this respect, the single most important proposition is that Israel remains the promised 
land of all Jews all over the world. Another important principle and objective of Zionism 
is the need to settle Jews in the land of Israel permanently with close connection to the 
land. Also of relevance is the Israeli policy of universal military conscription which is 
based on the notion that the entire Israeli society should be prepared for war with its 
hostile neighbors at all times (Berck & Lipow, 1994; Kartin, 2002).  
In contrast, Arab nationalism no longer constitutes a major national ideology in 
Lebanon. In fact, Arab nationalism as an ideology suffered a severe blow in the aftermath 
of the defeat during the Six-Day War. In the Lebanese context, this ideology suffered 
another severe blow as a result of the long civil war that afflicted Lebanon between 1975 
and 1990. As discussed earlier, it is Hezbollah’s ideology which incorporates both Shiite 
and national slogans that is currently attempting to dominate the political arena in 
Lebanon. Moreover, Hezbollah’s ideology is of significant relevance as far as this study 
is concerned because of the fact that Hezbollah has been the de facto force on the ground 
in the south and east where Lebanon shares its borders with Israel. This is not to mention 
that Hezbollah and its allies have successfully controlled half the vote in the consecutive 
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Lebanese cabinets since 2000 and the wields, since 2008, veto power over any major 
cabinet decisions. 
Although Lebanon may be home to several national ideologies at the same time, 
several basic principles and objectives can be identified. First of all, the dominant 
ideology in Lebanon accepts that cooperation with Israel is impossible and that Israel has 
permanent expansionary interest in Lebanon’s territories and resources. Secondly, within 
the context of Hezbollah’s ideology, much of which reflects the principles of the Islamic 
Revolution in Iran, Israel – along with the United States- is perceived as an absolute evil 
that must be annihilated. To compound this matter, both Hezbollah and its political 
opponents within Lebanon share the belief that Israel has a vested interest in Lebanon’s 
water sources as a means to resolve its water shortage problems.  
Lebanon and Israel share a long history of bloody conflicts which, in many ways, 
has contributed to the emergence of hardliner attitudes and policies on both sides of the 
border. In the 1970s, Lebanon was the target of several Israeli assaults while South 
Lebanon was the launching ground from which Palestinian militant groups waged a 
guerilla war against Israel. Following the 1978 and 1982 Israeli invasions of Lebanon, the 
long guerilla war that Hezbollah waged from 1982 until the final Israeli withdrawal from 
Lebanese territories in 2000, and the destructive 33-day war in 2006, the Lebanese-Israeli 
borders have finally enjoyed some peaceful stability, especially under the aegis UN 
peacekeeping forces in South Lebanon.  
In assessing the situation on both sides of the border, a vicious cycle seems to 
prevail. To begin with, the existence and emergence of hardened ideologies both in Israel 
and Lebanon have fed the tensions and military conflicts between the two countries. At 
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the same time, the tensions and military conflicts seem to have fueled and promoted the 
emergence and persistence of these hardened ideologies (Barnaby, 2009). On the Israeli 
side of the border, Israeli politicians often capitalize on the conflict with Lebanon as an 
opportunity to mobilize support and power, with belligerent discourse threatening to 
bomb Lebanon back to the “dark ages”. On the Lebanese side, the conflict with Israel 
takes a symbolic value as a means through which Hezbollah attempts to legitimize its 
power and status as an armed non-state actor, often mobilizing support by threatening to 
annihilate Israel with weapons delivered from Iran and Syria, liberating Jerusalem and 
returning Palestine to the Arabs (Shapira & Minzili, 2009).  
Despite the evident prevalence of hardliners on both sides of the border, this does 
not necessarily imply that ideological inflexibility and discourse completely negate 
prospects of communication and possible cooperation. In fact, through a number of 
intermediaries such as the German government and the International Committee of the 
Red Cross (ICRC), both sides have previously engaged in a number of communications 
even in the immediately aftermath of hostilities. These channels of communication were 
particularly prudent when it came to the exchange of prisoners and corpses. Hence, while 
neither side acknowledges the existence of the other from an ideological perspective, 
pragmatism often prevails when common interests are involved.  
4.3. Ideology & the Water Issue Perspective  
 
Chapter 2 identified and discussed the significance and relevance of the water 
issue for both sides, specifically from political and ideological perspectives. This section 
briefly sums up the ideological positions and the actual water realities in Israel and 
Lebanon with reference to economic realities and considerations.  
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4.3.1. The Israeli Perspective 
 
As discussed earlier, water occupies an extremely important position in Zionist 
ideology, specifically given the strategic and ideological objective of attracting Jewish 
immigrants from all over the world and settling them in agricultural land. From a Zionist 
ideological perspective, water is not just a matter of national security, but it is also an 
issue of defining the national identity and a basic pillar for the survival and sustainability 
of the State of Israel. Hence, it is a matter over which the proponents of this ideology are 
willing to go to war, as indeed they have repeatedly in the past. On the political level, the 
Zionist ideological discourse pertaining to water has been manifested in a number of 
strategic policies. First of all, this discourse has been the driving force behind the hostile 
Israeli policy toward its Palestinian, Syrian and Jordanian neighbors, specifically in terms 
of the acquisition of land and control of water sources by military force (Al-Kattan, 1998; 
Shapland, 1998). Secondly, it has motivated the ongoing Israeli policy to refuse any 
peaceful settlement with Syria as long as such peaceful negotiations involve returning 
land rich in water sources to the Syrian side. Thirdly, it is this ideological discourse that 
has, since 1948, driven the Israeli national policy of allocating significant political, 
economic and logistic resources to support and promote agricultural activity and the 
settlement of agricultural communities in the various regions of Israel, including the most 
arid regions. As a matter of fact, it is as a result of the full commitment of the Israeli state 
to the Zionist agricultural strategy that over 75% of waters available in Israel continue to 
be allocated for agricultural purposes at the expense of other needs, namely industry 
(Drake, 2000; Isaac, 2000; Kartin, 2002).  
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From an economic perspective, various Israeli politicians, economists and water 
experts have repeatedly expressed their concerns over the matter, warning that the Zionist 
water strategy is not viable in the long term and that the national water strategy must 
change in response to economic, social and political realities. Economically and socially, 
the persistent Israeli strategy has favored agriculture and agricultural activities over any 
other economic and social activities that require water sources. However, the Israeli 
economy has transformed substantially since the 1970s with the emergence of a massive 
industrial sector, whereas the importance of agriculture as an economic sector has 
continued to decline. Despite these transformations, consecutive Israeli governments 
have maintained their commitment to the Zionist ideology, allocating the majority of the 
nation’s water sources to agricultural activities (Drake 2000; Isaac, 2000).  
By and large, several prominent Israeli water experts have warned that cutting 
water allocation to agriculture by 25% would resolve much of the nation’s water 
problems and would create new opportunities for reducing Israel’s tensions over water 
with its neighbors, especially Syria and the Palestinians Territories in the short term, and 
Lebanon in the long term. Most Israeli politicians, however, have responded to such calls 
in one of two manners. On the one hand, politicians aware of the economic and social 
realities of their national water problem simply choose to dodge the issue and avoid 
placing it on their political agenda altogether. On the other hand, the majority of these 
politicians have chosen to commit their agendas to the Zionist ideological principles, 
turning the water issue into a slogan to promote their political careers or mobilize support 
during election times or whenever their political fortunes declined (Drake 2000; Isaac 
2000).  
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4.3.2. The Lebanese Perspective 
 
While the Israeli perspective is confined to the predominance of the Zionist 
ideology in as far as the water issue is concerned, the Lebanese perspective manifests a 
number of complications. Firstly, as discussed earlier, the Lebanese State had historically 
maintained a passive discourse in which it claimed that Lebanon neither enjoyed water 
surpluses nor suffered water shortages. Secondly, the rise of Hezbollah as an armed non-
state actor in south and east Lebanon has also resulted in the emergence of two different 
ideological perspectives in Lebanon; One that is officially endorsed by the state and 
which considers Lebanon as a state that supports the Arabs and Palestinians in their 
conflict with Israel, and another that is promoted by Hezbollah and which considers 
Lebanon as a state involved in direct confrontation with Israel. As far as the water issue is 
concerned, and despite their many and fundamental differences, both ideological 
discourses have been converging rapidly in recent years (Shapira & Minzili, 2009).  
The convergence of these two ideological perspectives over the water issue can be 
attributed to a number of reasons. First of all, the problem of water shortages has been 
fast-metastasizing as a serious problem in Lebanon. Over the past decade, for example, 
agricultural, industrial and urban centers have repeatedly complained about water 
shortage problems. In the summer of 2010, for example, all Lebanese cities without 
exception suffered severe water shortage issues. Although these shortages are mainly 
caused by the poor management of water sources and supplies as well as the lack of 
investment in new water distribution networks, as far as the public conscious is 
concerned, Lebanon has now joined the rank of water-impoverished countries. 
Consequently, hardliner positions that consider water as an issue of national security, and 
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hence the readiness to support hostile actions in defense of water sources, now enjoy far 
more popularity and support than at any time in the past. Secondly, repeated Israeli 
statements revealing interest in natural resources that arguably fall within Lebanese 
territory or waters such as oil, natural gas and water sources have also created significant 
support for ideological and political discourse that endorse hardened positions against 
Israeli interest in Lebanese water sources.  
4.4. Obstacles & Opportunities 
 
The assessment of the water-related ideological discourse in Lebanon and Israel 
reveals a number of serious obstacles that prevent cooperation. To begin with, as a result 
of domestic and regional political factors, Israel continues to maintain its strategy of 
controlling as many water sources and as much water as it can, irrespective of whether 
this results in additional tensions and hostilities with its neighbors. Secondly, Israeli 
politicians exploiting water as a domestic political item on their personal political 
agendas has further placed Israeli policymakers in a tight spot as most are unable to 
retreat from these hardliner positions, even if these positions supported water-related 
policies that were economically, socially and politically counterproductive. Similarly, on 
the Lebanese side, the combination of water shortages caused by poor water planning and 
distribution, rather than the scarcity of water and fears of Israeli interests in Lebanese 
waters, has resulted in solidifying hardened political positions insofar as the water issue is 
concerned. Despite the growing chorus of pessimism, it is possible to identify several 
opportunities for a change in ideological positions and for cooperation with respect to the 
water issue. First of all, the Israeli policy is rapidly reaching the end of the road as Israeli 
experts are now warning that the current national water strategy is impossible to sustain 
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over the next few years unless the government takes substantial measures by reducing 
water allocations to agriculture by at least 25% or by expanding the supply, most 
probably through another war and subsequent annexation. Another war, however, must 
be with Lebanon where viable water sources lie, But as the history of the armed conflicts 
with and occupation of Lebanon has shown in the past three decades, the feasibility of 
such a sustainable military endeavor is not only too costly and dangerous, but next to 
impossible (Isaac, 2000; Wolf, 2008).  
Secondly, Lebanon too has reached the end of the line with respect to its outdated 
water planning and distribution policies and will require massive modernization in this 
sector, in addition to substantially changing its strategic objectives on this issue. 
However, the Lebanese side faces a quagmire in water-rich areas, especially in South 
Lebanon. Not only is South Lebanon considered a dangerous zone as a result of the 
tensions between Hezbollah and Israel, but senior Israeli officials have repeatedly made 
clear that any attempts by the Lebanese government to construct major water projects in 
South Lebanon could result in immediate war or at least in the bombings of those 
installations. Although Israel does not contest Lebanon’s rights to using most of the rivers 
and springs in South Lebanon, it has repeatedly expressed its concerns about Lebanese 
plans to divert the waters of the Hasbani River, whose flow, Israel argues, should be 
combined with the flow of the Jordan River (Wessels, 2009).  
The Hasbani River dispute is in itself a source of opportunity for both sides to 
cooperate over since Lebanon has little use for this river since that part of the country is 
rich in a number of major springs as well as smaller rivers that efficiently provide water 
to agricultural lands. At the same time, however, the Lebanese are unable to make any 
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substantial use of most of their water sources in South Lebanon as a result of the ongoing 
tensions and the repeated Israeli threats to bomb and destroy any major installations that 
it suspects may be used to divert the flow of the Hasbani River (Priscoli & Wolf, 2009).  
As a matter of fact, it must also be noted that while South Lebanon is relatively 
very rich in water sources, the adjacent region of northern Israel on the other side of the 
border is extremely water impoverished. While such geographic proximity and variation 
in water sources may be causes for conflict between Lebanon and Israel, the variation in 
the water needs by both sides can be transformed into an opportunity for cooperation if 
and once the two sides acknowledge the possibility of such mutual cooperation and once 
they perceive water shortage as a problem common to both of them.  
4.5. Conclusion 
 
Eliminating the ideological, political and other sensitivities from the picture, a 
distinctive image emerges. On the Lebanese side of the border, rich water sources flow 
without any real effective usage or exploitation. On the opposite Israeli side of the border, 
water-starved lands desperately await for solutions. The Israelis possess advanced 
technologies and industrial capabilities that the Lebanese lack and need. The Lebanese 
possess abundant water sources that exceed their needs in that region sources which they 
are unable to effectively exploit for technical, political and security reasons. It is within 
this context that opportunities exist to circumvent the tough positions that ideological 
discourse and political maneuvering have left politicians within Israel and Lebanon. 
Communities in both countries are starving for water and economic development, and 
what one country has in abundance; the other lacks severely and needs badly. It is within 
such a context that the water conflict between Lebanon and Israel can be transformed into 
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an opportunity for cooperation to resolve immediate water-related problems in the short 
term, and hopefully achieve peace-related objectives in the long-term.  
In light of these potential opportunities for cooperation and peaceful agreement, 
Chapter 5 will propose a plan of action through which the opportunities identified in this 
chapter can be transformed into tangible policies and steps toward cooperation and 
peaceful resolution, both in the short term and long term. The chapter will attempt to 
reconcile the water models discussed in Chapter 3 with the opportunities identified in 
Chapter 4, ultimately resulting in a feasible and viable plan of action that overcomes the 
ideological and political obstacles identified in Chapter 4.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
V­ CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDED ACTION PLAN 
5.1. Introduction 
 
The objective of this chapter is to present the conclusions of the research findings 
as well as the various water models that have been suggested or implemented previously. 
The second part of this chapter will propose an action plan for implementation as a means 
to achieve cooperation between Israel and Lebanon on the use of water sources in a more 
efficient and productive manner with the hope that the success of such a model will 
attract other parties to become involved in what can become a multilateral model of 
cooperation to resolve the problem of water shortage in the Middle East. More 
importantly, the proposed action plan rests on the assumption that attaining a peaceful 
model of cooperation over water may constitute a window of opportunity for additional 
initiatives to reach a peaceful conclusion of the Middle East conflict that has been raging 
on for much of the past century.  
5.2. Summary & Conclusions 
 
With the rapid growth in world populations and the pressing needs of urbanization 
and industrialization all over the world, water continues to be a source of tension and, 
occasionally conflicts among different nations. In many parts of the world, nations have 
opted for multilateral cooperation-based solutions. Such solutions have been 
implemented successfully not only between and among friendly neighbors, but 
occasionally even between sworn enemies. In the Middle East, tensions and conflicts 
have dominated the scene, especially in so far as Israel is involved. Except for a peaceful 
 63
agreement with Jordan over sharing the waters of the Jordan River, the approach to 
addressing water issues with other parties such as the Palestinians Territories, Syria and 
Lebanon has generally been unilateral, confrontational and conflict-oriented (Shapland, 
1997; Al-Kattan, 1998). In addition to this, most water experts agree that the water 
supply in the Middle East has already dangerously exceeded the demand, which implies 
heightened risks of the outbreak of new conflicts over water (Drake, 2000; Isaac, 2000; 
Tomanbay, 2000).  
Incidentally, however, the choice of war which seems to have been the preferred 
approach by Israel as well as other Arab states, may no longer be viable. Even with 
Israel’s military superiority, its ability to acquire new territory and establish full control 
over water sources (as was the case in 1967) has been dangerously compromised as the 
July 2006 War clearly demonstrated (Khalifeh, 2008; Shapira & Minzili, 2009). At the 
same time, neither Syria, Lebanon nor the Palestinian Territories are in a position to 
initiate a military war over water against Israel. Political leaders on all sides are probably 
very aware of the fact that war over water has become too expensive and costly (Priscoli 
& Wolf, 2009), unviable and impossible to justify (Fredericksen, 2009). Realistically, this 
does not exclude the possibility that Israel and its neighbors will not go to war over other 
issues such as territorial or maritime borders or other national-security-related issues. On 
the other hand, however, the possibility that one side can wage a war over the other and 
ultimately acquire and control water sources in a way that makes it possible to use them 
in an economically or socially sustainable manner is simply unrealistic.  
It is amidst these strategic paradigm shifts that the opportunity for alternative 
peaceful solutions emerges, especially as political leaders and decision-makers in Israel, 
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Lebanon, Syria and the Palestinian Territories become more aware of the parallel push 
arising from the futility of military solutions and the pressing nature of economic and 
social needs imposed by water shortages in the region. The search for innovative and 
creative solutions thus becomes a necessity that both sides will have to acknowledge 
sooner or later, and it is within this framework that this study falls.  
The single most important conclusion of this study is that military action is no 
longer a viable solution for water shortage issues. While the Middle East remains at risk 
of military confrontations, it will by no means result in any practical solutions insofar as 
water shortages in the Middle East are concerned (Isaac, 2000; Issar, 2008).  
Secondly, water shortage issues, in terms of quantity and quality, have already 
become the single most defining aspect of the water reality in the region, even in 
Lebanon which was historically envied for its water abundance and wealth (Drake, 2000; 
Zaslasky, 2001; Khalifeh, 2008).  
Thirdly, there is strong evidence indicating that the ideological positions that have 
historically and recently dominated the political, social and economic arenas, particularly 
in the Levant, have become a burden in as far as the water shortage issue is concerned. In 
Israel, the predominant Zionist ideology that has, for over a century, driven the national 
ethos and contributed to the formation of Israel as a viable state and nation is now at odds 
with water realities. The allocation of vast water sources for agricultural purpose in the 
service of Zionist ideological objectives is simply impossible to sustain, adding 
significant pressures on political decision-makers in Israel (Isaac, 2000; Kartin, 2000). 
Likewise in Lebanon, the growing aggressive rhetoric that holds water as a sacred 
resource may have served the ideological purposes of Hezbollah and the Lebanese State, 
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but by no means does it provide any real and practical solutions, especially insofar as it 
creates a state of stalemate in South Lebanon where the Lebanese are unable to use their 
waters without facing the risk of instigating a military response from Israel which 
considers such actions a direct threat to its national security (Khalifeh, 2008).  
Fourthly, the evaluation of possible non-military unilateral solutions and models 
such as water desalination schemes, water purchasing, demand and supply management 
and other similar means indicates that such solutions may only result in very limited 
positive outcomes and improvements in addressing the water shortage challenges facing 
countries such as Israel and Lebanon, and only in the short term. In the long term, 
however, these countries are not only faced with troubling prospects of hostilities 
between one another, but their continuously growing water needs indicate that the 
economic, social and political pressures that will emerge from the issues of water are 
unprecedented (Shapland, 1997; Zaslasky, 2001; Khalifeh, 2008; Wolf, 2008; Priscoli & 
Wolf, 2009).  
Finally, the traditional perception of water on the social, economic and political 
level needs to be dramatically transformed in the Middle East. As a result of this 
demanded transformation, it is important to focus on the fact that water has no respect for 
political agendas and ideologies, economic realities or territorial borders. Water simply 
crosses through all these barriers and imposes its own agenda around which the political, 
social and economic factors must act. More specifically, water should be seen as an 
economic good, this would constitute the beginning of the shift in the mindset of the 
actors in the region (Allan, 1997; Wolf, 2008).  
 66
5.3. Recommended Action Plan 
 
Before presenting the recommended action plan, it is important to review the assumptions 
upon which this plan is based.  
5.3.1. Assumptions  
 
Some assumptions should be highlighted on which the recommended action plan is 
based. Firstly, it should be noted that even when the risk of military conflict continues to 
persist, military solutions for water shortages are too expensive and costly and, above all, 
neither viable nor sustainable by either side. Secondly, acknowledging the fact that 
cooperation over water does not in any way imply that the actors will give up their 
sovereignty or their claims for other demands in relation to disputed territories or on any 
other issues related to the greater conflict in the Middle East. Thirdly, acknowledging the 
fact that despite the animosity involving nations, previous experiences show that even 
nations at conflict are capable of attaining viable and sustainable cooperation over water 
issues. In the Middle East, repeated experiences in recent history have shown that such 
cooperation is possible even at times of heightened tensions such as the exchange of 
prisoners and corpses between Israel and Lebanon on a number of occasions in recent 
years. Fourthly, with the current realities, the need for a trusted third party that enjoys an 
acceptable level of credibility in terms of its intentions, experience, expertise in water 
issues, and willingness and ability to provide technical and non-technical support to both 
sides. Although the United States qualifies as the most powerful mediator in the Middle 
East, its credibility has been repeatedly question, especially with respect to its flagrant 
support of Israel. Other actors, such as the United Kingdom, the Republic of Ireland, 
Germany, Turkey or the European Union may prove to be more effective mediators.   
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Ultimately, there is a need to minimize the political dimensions involved in the 
development of possible innovative and creative solutions for water problems, at least in 
the initial stages of developing the framework for cooperative solutions. Isolating the 
model from political interventions and ideological influences is essential to creating an 
alternative vision around which decision-makers may then have to make adaptations or 
introduce their own concerns and limitations. To accomplish this task, it is also important 
to mediate and encourage inputs from experts on both sides with the availability of 
technical assistance and expertise from the mediating side.  
5.3.2. Objectives of the Action Plan 
 
The objectives of this action plan are four-fold. Firstly, there is a necessity to create a 
forum for experts to develop a multilateral cooperation-based framework solution for the 
water problems facing Israel and Lebanon, and eventually other countries in the region at 
a later stage. Secondly, it should be accompanied by setting grounds to encourage the 
actors to reach viable solutions that can be isolated, or at least protected from the 
oscillation of tensions and risks of military confrontations in the region, while at the same 
time addressing the social and economic needs of the communities on both sides of the 
border and without ignoring the political and security realities on the ground. Thirdly, 
both the Israelis and Lebanese should be encouraged to perceive water as a vital 
economic resource whose scarcity shows no respect for political borders, security 
concerns or the diversity and distinction of economic and social needs. The ultimate 
objective in this sense is to carry both actors to one side of the table in the face of water 
shortage and its related problems as the real enemy.  
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Lastly, both the Israelis and Lebanese should be stimulated to search for, identify and 
consider innovative and creative solutions that circumvent political, ideological, military 
and security differences and fears, and in doing so, encouraging them to think of 
solutions that can be implemented effectively in a manner that maximizes mutual benefits 
and minimizes costs for the communities and political actors on both sides.  
5.3.3. The Action Plan  
 
The recommended action plan consists of the below mentioned steps. First of all, the 
need to initiate mediation efforts by a credible and experienced third party (e.g. a water or 
environmental consortium, or the departments of energy and water in a European country 
that is deemed acceptable by both sides). The mediation efforts must focus on getting the 
approval of Israel and Lebanon for this initiative by providing assurances that it has no 
political consequences for either side, while at the same time encouraging them to share 
information, data and knowledge on water-related issues. This step is also necessary to 
ensure that water experts from either side will not be subject to blackmail or intimidated 
by opportunist politicians or radicals. Secondly, the necessity to isolate the workings of 
the forum from political interventions, interferences, pressures or other factors and ensure 
that the generation of ideas is motivated by scientific and objective interests and goals. 
Then, the importance of creating effective and reliable means for the sharing and 
exchange of data, information, knowledge and ideas among the participating experts on 
both sides.3 
                                                 
3 While Israeli experts may not face a problem in participating directly, Lebanese experts are legally 
banned from establishing any direct communication with Israeli officials, experts or citizens. Such direct 
communications have occurred in the past, but only in secrecy or when all political actors, especially the 
state and Hezbollah, had accepted such direct exchange or communication to occur. Consequently, this is a 
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Thirdly, the importance of introducing previously and effectively tested models such as 
the experiences between India and its neighbors, the River Jordan agreement between 
Israel and Jordan, the Nile Basin agreement and various other case studies to derive 
lessons learned and possible guidelines for what should and should not be considered 
when proposing new working solutions. Fourthly, the requisite to develop several 
evaluation models, especially cost-benefit analysis and other economic valuation models 
while taking into consideration communal needs on both sides in order to achieve a shift 
in the mindset on water. This forum should also be an opportunity to engage in a 
simulation testing exercise of the virtual water model as a possible alternative.               
They should at the same time focus the deliberations and exchange of ideas on 
cooperation and projects of mutual benefits while acknowledging that they may be 
politically impossible. Although effective solutions may be reached eventually, political 
realities may prevent their execution. However, this can be changed through awareness 
campaigns that may require years of education, persuasion and lobbying on both sides of 
the border until the political perspectives and attitudes are changed.  
Fifthly, focus on the benefits for the communities and economics on both sides with 
emphasis on development opportunities as opposed to the catastrophic outcomes of the 
current status quo and the limitations and costs of unilateral solutions. The findings of 
this step should also eventually become the foundation of awareness campaigns to be 
introduced both in Israel and in Lebanon.  
Sixthly, an essential part is to invite water experts from other countries that qualify as 
stakeholders or that enjoy influence over the water issue in the Middle East, especially 
                                                                                                                                                 
matter that the mediator has to take into consideration with the possible solution of using indirect 
communication as a final alternative.  
 70
from Turkey, Syria, the Palestinian Territories, Jordan, and Egypt.4 And at the same time, 
also invite politicians from Israel and Lebanon to share the results and outcomes of the 
forum and engage political leaders and other potential mediators to consider the means by 
which the proposed solutions can be introduced despite the political and other obstacles 
on the ground. Ultimately, it is essential to present the results and outcomes to 
community leaders, NGOs and other social and political actors in both countries, as well 
as to other countries in the region, to trigger possible change in public opinions and to 
encourage civil society to participate in pushing for peaceful and effective solutions for 
water problems by initiating bottom-up pressure on politicians and decision-makers to 
change their attitudes and relax their hardened ideologically-driven positions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 Both Turkey and Egypt have in the past proposed a variety of water-trading agreements in addition to the 
possibility of building water pipelines extending over the entire region as part of a comprehensive peaceful 
agreement involving Israel and its immediate neighbors.  
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